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FORCINGS
Lee Anne Fennell*
Eminent domain receives enormous amounts of scholarly and popular
attention, and for good reason—it is a powerful form of government
coercion that cuts to the heart of ownership. But a mirror-image form of
government coercion has been almost entirely ignored: forced ownership,
or “forcings.” While legal compulsion to begin or continue ownership is
neither entirely unstudied as an academic matter nor entirely
unprecedented as a doctrinal matter, the category lacks a unified treatment.
Because coercively imposed ownership can substitute for other forms of
government coercion, forcings deserve attention, even if they will rarely
dominate other alternatives. Attending to forcings as a conceptual
possibility reveals their kinship with existing features of law and highlights
one of ownership’s most essential moves: delivering actual outcomes, and
not just their expected value equivalents. Unpacking the considerations that
might prompt law to impose ownership on unwilling parties points the way
to alternatives short of full-strength compelled ownership. The analysis also
suggests an additional domain of government action—“relievings”—for
unburdening owners of unwanted property.
INTRODUCTION
Takings, or involuntary terminations of ownership, have a widely
ignored logical counterpart: involuntary impositions of ownership, or
“forcings.” Although legal doctrines of long standing sometimes compel
people to own or to continue owning property,1 the phenomenon of
compelled ownership remains undertheorized. This paper takes on this
neglected conceptual category. Attending to forcings generates important
*
Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert & Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law
School. I am grateful to Gani Aldashev, Kenneth Ayotte, Shawn Bayern, Vicki Been, Hanoch Dagan, Giuseppe
Dari-Mattiacci, Christopher Fennell, Andrew Gold, Bernard Harcourt, Shi-Ling Hsu, Aziz Huq, Larissa Katz,
Daniel Kelly, Jake Linford, Anup Malani, Jonathan Nash, Eduardo Peñalver, James Penner, Ariel Porat, Margaret
Schilt, Henry Smith, Lior Strahilevitz, Hannah Wiseman, Katrina Wyman, and participants in faculty workshops
at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Florida State University College of Law, Tulane University Law School, the
University of Chicago Law School, the University of Virginia School of Law, the 2013 NYU Property Theory
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and the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support.
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See infra Part I.A.
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theoretical and policy payoffs, including the possibility that compelled
ownership could substitute for or augment other forms of government
coercion such as eminent domain.
Consider blighted urban properties that have been vacated by defaulting
owners and neglected by mortgagees. Eminent domain designed to keep
owners in possession is the hot button strategy de jour for cities like
Richmond, California.2 But the ends of local governments facing the risk of
foreclosure blight might also be achieved by requiring someone—perhaps
the lender, perhaps a party developing an adjacent parcel—to step up to the
plate of ownership when the owner in possession decamps. More broadly,
some of the land assemblies currently pursued through eminent domain
might instead be created by requiring existing owners to expand their
holdings if they wish to stay in place. Forced ownership might also be used
remedially, or as a form of prospective land use control, to compel owners
to absorb responsibility for the areas that they impact.
The idea of pressing ownership on an unwilling party might seem like
an obvious non-starter for at least two reasons. First, one might think that
an unwilling owner will necessarily be a low-valuing owner, and hence an
objectively bad owner. If the point of property is to get resources into the
hands of the highest valuing user, forcings might seem to push in exactly
the wrong direction. Second, the interference with personal autonomy
associated with forced ownership might seem so great as to make forcings a
normatively toxic idea, as well as a political impossibility. The reactions to
the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act (as well as to the more
ominous prospect of forced broccoli purchases) suggest intense popular
resistance to forced acquisitions of unwanted things.3
These points are undermined by the fact that the law already imposes
several forms of forced ownership, from remedies for conversion and
accession to limits on abandonment. Far from being alien or unprecedented,
doctrines that produce and sustain unwanted ownership are threaded
throughout the law. Of course, ownership is rarely foisted on parties out of
the blue; rather, it is bundled with some earlier act or omission—often, an
earlier choice to undertake some form of voluntary ownership. These
observations lead to two lines of inquiry that are pursued here. First, what
2
See, e.g., Shila Dwan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2013 (reporting
on Richmond’s plan to use eminent domain to seize underwater mortgages in order to provide loans with new
terms to homeowners); Robert Rogers, Both Sides in Richmond Eminent Domain Plan Set for Showdown at City
Council Meeting, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013 (reporting on controversy surrounding the plan, which has
already attracted litigation).
3
See Supreme Court of the United States, Oral Argument Transcript, Department of Health and Human
Services v. Florida, March 27, 2012, at 13 (Scalia, J.) (asking whether the reasoning supporting the required
purchase
of
health
insurance would
also
justify the
forced
purchase
of
broccoli)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf; see also James B.
Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012 (reporting on Justice Scalia’s
question and tracing the roots of the analogy).
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considerations would prompt the law to impose ownership, as opposed to a
monetary obligation, on an unwilling party? Second, what normative
justifications and limits govern the bundling of ownership obligations with
earlier choices?
Examining existing forms of forced ownership directs attention to one
of property’s most essential moves: providing a vehicle for delivering actual
outcomes rather than their expected value equivalents. This core feature of
the ownership strategy has implications for information costs, risk
allocation, and incentive alignment. Social benefits thus may be uniquely
achieved through ownership itself. Although these benefits can usually be
realized by encouraging willing ownership, such inducements may be
insufficient where a given party occupies a monopoly position with respect
to a strongly complementary resource or property interest.
The fact that forced ownership can advance social goals does not, of
course, complete the case for it. As with takings, forcings can selectively
impose burdens that should in fairness be spread across society.4 And, as
with takings, baseline questions quickly emerge when assessing the sorts of
uncompensated burdens that individuals should be made to bear. That
compensation could be used in tandem with forcings raises interesting
untapped possibilities even as it introduces questions about the adequacy
(and indeed commensurability) of compensation that mirror those found in
the takings arena.
Interestingly, recognizing the category of forcings suggests an
additional domain for governmental action, which I term “relievings.” As
the name suggests, this move would involve the government removing
burdensome and unwanted ownership from an erstwhile owner and either
retaining ownership itself or imposing ownership on a third party. Those
who find forcings to be normatively objectionable should be particularly
interested in relievings, because the failure to engage in relieving often
effectively produces a type of forcing—forced retention. Consider again
defaulting mortgagors who have vacated the premises and wish to
relinquish ownership, but cannot legally do so. The relevant policy
question is not whether the government should force someone to own the
property in question, but rather who it shall force to take on that role.
The analysis here connects to several bodies of prior literature. Forced
acquisition equates to the exercise of a put option, a move that has received
attention in the literature on entitlement configuration.5 The compelled
4

Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
In finance, a put option gives the holder the right but not the obligation to force a purchase of a specified
item on the option-writing party at a specified price. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 503–05 (10th ed. 2011). Scholars have recognized that legal rules could
operate in an analogous manner. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW (2005); Ian Ayres, Protecting Property
with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 810 (1998); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 822, 854-56 (1993).
5
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continuation of ownership has been examined in the context of legal limits
on abandonment6 and destruction.7 Weaker forms of pressure to begin or
continue ownership can be found in many other legal features that have
received academic treatment, from limits on free alienability to legal
requirements that owners accept certain property bundles on an all-ornothing basis.8 Finally, forcings bear a family resemblance to givings,
which have been previously analyzed as a counterpoint to takings.9 This
paper draws on these disparate strands to provide a unified treatment of a
topic that has received surprisingly little attention: the use (and misuse) of
governmentally compelled ownership of real and personal property.
The analysis proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines existing instances
of unwanted ownership, broadly construed. Part II traces possible rationales
for requiring parties to begin or continue ownership. Central to this
discussion is an understanding of why ownership that is viewed as
individually undesirable might nonetheless be viewed as socially desirable.
Part III charts where forcings fit into a broader understanding of property
ownership and state power. Part IV suggests ways in which compulsory
ownership could be extended, as well as circumstances in which it might be
refined or replaced with less coercive approaches or non-ownership
alternatives.
Before beginning, a few words about scope are in order. My focus here
is on compelled ownership of real property and, to a lesser extent, personal
property. Although forcings involving services and benefits also present
important issues,10 my particular interest in this paper is on the way in
which the ownership of physical things simultaneously empowers owners to
manage inputs and exposes them to the risk of actual outcomes.11 Although
parts of the discussion will reach nonpossessory land use rights, a principal
6
See, e.g., Eduardo Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191 (2010); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355 (2010).
7
See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
8
See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173-82 (1999)
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1374 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics,
and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 15-16 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1985); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009).
9
Past work has considered the governmental conferral of benefits -- “givings” -- as the flip side of takings.
See, e.g., WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (Donald G. Hagman & Dean
J. Misczynski, eds., 1978); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).
However, because this work has focused on recapturing windfalls through the imposition of monetary charges
rather than the offloading of unwanted property, it has not fully engaged with the concept of “forcings” as
developed here.
10
For example, restitution, although strictly limited in scope, can be understood within its operative domain
as the forced purchase of benefits that have been conferred on unconsenting parties. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private
Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009) (discussing limits
on restitution and proposing that the doctrine be expanded). Insurance purchases are often compelled as well,
either expressly or through law or policy. More broadly, the government forces the purchase of various bundles
of services through taxation.
11
It is possible that some forms of intellectual property operate similarly, although I do not take up the
question here.
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distinction between this work and much of the previous literature on put
options is the emphasis that I place on outcomes experienced over time by
owners of possessory interests in property.12
I. UNWANTED OWNERSHIP
Forcings involve ownership that is unwanted by the owner herself. In
this Part, I examine existing instances of unwanted ownership, broadly
construed. To be sure, many of the examples I discuss do not readily lend
themselves to the label of “forced ownership”; the unwanted ownership
interest follows (or is even generated by) some voluntary choice. This
overinclusion is intentional. My goal is not to demonstrate that the law is
rife with ownership that is compelled in a strong sense, but rather that
unwanted ownership is accepted and even embraced in many legal contexts.
Establishing this point sets the stage for Part II’s inquiry into the purposes
that might be served by ownership that is aversive to the owner herself.
Section A presents a number of examples organized around the two
basic ways in which unwanted ownership arises—through unwanted
acquisition and through unwanted retention. Section B lays out the reasons
that ownership might be aversive. Section C distills lessons about the
category of unwanted ownership and confronts a definitional puzzle about
its boundaries.
A. Existing Examples
How might people end up in unwanted relationships with property? In
a purely chronological sense, there are two possibilities: the person did not
want to become an owner in the first place (“unwanted acquisition”) or she
initially desired ownership but soured on it later (“unwanted retention”).
1. Unwanted Acquisition
Unwanted acquisition sometimes comes about through the direct
imposition of a legal remedy, or through a contractual or statutory
obligation that would enforce such a remedy. In other cases an unsought
(but unrebuffed or unrebuffable) transfer from another party or a natural
event produces a legally enforceable ownership obligation. Other unwanted
12
Some work on put options has recognized forced purchases of possessory interests (as in trover, accession,
and mistaken improver cases), but the analysis has focused primarily on private choices whether to transfer land
use rights. For example, the potential role of put options in addressing nuisance claims has received attention in
the entitlement literature. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 5, at 29-38. Like the call options to which they are framed
as an alternative, the put options under discussion involve entitlements to make certain uses of property or the
surrounding airspace, not full fee interests.

6

Fennell

[6-Nov-13

acquisitions come from bundling requirements that attach to desired
property interests.
Remedial, Statutory, and Contractual Acquisition. Courts compel
purchases remedially in a variety of circumstances. For example, courts will
at times order specific performance against an unwilling buyer in a contract
to purchase land.13 Trover, the compelled purchase of chattel property, is
the traditional remedy for the tort of conversion.14 The shopkeeper’s
warning, “You Break It, You Buy It,” may be understood as operating in
the shadow of this remedial regime.
In other instances, courts may prescribe a purchase as one of two (or
more) remedial alternatives. For example, landowners who have suffered
encroachments by innocent improvers may be given a choice between
forcing a sale of the underlying land to the encroacher or purchasing the
improvements.15 A landowner who has actively encouraged a mistaken
improvement may be treated more harshly; in one case, such an owner was
forced to purchase the house that had been built on his land.16 Principles of
accession may similarly require forced purchases where a party has
improved raw materials to create a new product: either the party who took
the raw materials may be forced to purchase them, or the party who owned
the raw materials may be required to purchase the improvements.17
13
More commonly, specific performance of a real estate contract is imposed on an unwilling seller. But
courts have shown themselves willing to turn the tables and make the buyer go through with the deal too. See,
e.g., Humphries v. Ables, 789 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“The equitable doctrine is that the enforcement
of contracts must be mutual, and, the vendee being entitled to specific performance, his vendor must likewise be
permitted in equity to compel the acceptance of his deed and the payment of the stipulated consideration.”)
(quoting Migatz v. Stieglitz, 166 Ind. 361, 77 N.E. 400 (1906)); Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, 783
N.W.2d 294 (Wisc. 2010) (holding that specific performance was available to sellers of real estate, and declining
to add a proviso that would require a finding of no adequate remedy at law).
14
The plaintiff traditionally had a choice between trover, which forces a sale on the converter, and replevin,
which involves recovering the property along with damages. See AYRES, supra note 5, at 27. In modern times, the
forced sale option may not be available where the converted item is returned relatively undamaged. See RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (10th ed. 2012).
15
See, e.g., Hardy v. Borroughs 232 N.W. 200, 201 (Mich. 1930); see also Pull v. Barnes, 350 P.2d 828
(Colo. 1960) (granting innocent improver the right to remove the cabin he had constructed, if feasible, or to place
a lien on the land equal to the value of the cabin). The owner of the underlying land might instead be forced to sell
to the encroacher. See, e.g., Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805 (Ct. App. W.Va. 1969); Mannillo v. Gorsky,
255 A.2d 258, 264 (N.J. 1969). Traditionally, encroached-upon owners could insist on injunctive relief (which
might require the encroacher to tear down their structure) or request damages, effectively forcing a purchase of the
encroached-upon land. See Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895); AYRES, supra note 5, at 28. Under modern law,
a forced transfer is a more likely judicial response to a good faith improvement than injunctive relief, at least
where the latter would impose a disproportionate hardship on the innocent encroacher. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET
AL., PROPERTY 141 (7th ed. 2010). For a discussion and analysis of different possible rules for addressing
encroachments, see Matteo Rizzolli Building Encroachments, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 661 (2009).
16
Ollig v. Eagles, 78 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Mich. 1956) (granting a lien upon the landowner’s property for “the
reasonable value of the improvements [plaintiff] made to this land, excluding any contribution to the above made
by [defendant’s] wife and by defendant, and set off by the reasonable rental value of the unimproved land which
[plaintiff] used for the years he occupied it”).
17
The general rule is that the owner of “the larger or more valuable input” gets to keep the thing in question.
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 466 (2009). Various rules
determine the compensation, if any, due to the other party, but one possible outcome is a forced purchase of the
other party’s input. This may be accomplished through a lien on the property that contains the input. See e.g.,
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The bounds of remedial ownership remain unclear, however, as a recent
example illustrates. A couple in Upper Milford Township, Pennsylvania
sued their neighbor, a registered sex offender who had pleaded guilty to an
indecent assault on their young daughter, in an effort to force him to
purchase their home.18 The forced purchase of a fee interest in real estate
may be an unlikely remedy for the court to order in such a case.19 But the
idea of countering land use conflicts with purchase demands is not
unprecedented. Conditional variances in New Jersey offer neighboring
landowners a choice between suffering the grant of the variance or making a
binding offer to purchase the property for which the offending variance has
been sought.20 The government is given a similar choice—stop regulating or
pay up—when a landowner succeeds on an inverse condemnation suit.21
Sometimes the law will force a swap of property for property,
effectively compelling both a sale and a purchase. For example, judicial
partition in kind simultaneously dispossesses the erstwhile co-tenant of a
fractional undivided share in the whole property while forcibly conveying a
full ownership interest in a portion of the property.22 Land readjustment
schemes may operate similarly to deliver new land in place of old. 23 In
Richard A. Epstein, Protecting Property with Legal Remedies: A Commonsense Reply to Professor Ayres, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 851 (1998).
18
See Patrick Lester, Family Sues to Force Sex Offender to Buy Its House, MORNING CALL, Mar. 16, 2013.
The man had returned to the neighborhood after serving time in prison for the assault. The couple claimed that
the house had lost value as a result of his presence and that they felt under great pressure to move. Id.
19
Law professors contacted by the press about the case saw little chance that the court would grant the
requested relief. See id. (quoting Douglas Laycock for the idea that a forced home purchase might be part of a
settlement but “would be odd as a court-ordered remedy”); id. (attributing to Anthony Sabino the view that the
remedy might violate the 8th Amendment); Christina Ng, Family Sues to Force Sex Offender to Buy Its House,
ABC.com, Mar. 20, 2013 (quoting Jamison Colburn regarding the “extraordinary nature of the relief they’re
asking,” which he viewed as presenting “an uphill battle”).
20
See, e.g., Nash v. Bd. of Adjustment, 474 A.2d 241, 246 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the offer must
constitute the fair market value that the property would have if the variance were granted). If such an offer is
made, the owners of the property have the choice to sell at that price or keep the property without the variance.
See id. at 245. In other words, the owners who otherwise meet the criteria for a variance will receive either a
variance or a put option with a strike price equal to the fair market value of the property with the variance.
21
Where a taking is found, the government may discontinue its regulation (and pay for the interim taking) or
pay just compensation to acquire the property interest. The former situation amounts to a forced purchase of a
time slice. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
318–19 (1987). A similarly structured choice was provided under the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic
Area Act prior to its 1991 amendment. Michael C. Blumm & Joshua D. Smith, Protecting the Columbia River
Gorge: A Twenty-Year Experiment in Land-Use Federalism, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 201, 218-19 (2006)
(examining the “opt-out” provision for Special Management Areas, which required the government to either
accept a landowner’s bona fide offer to sell the property at fair market value or release the landowner from the
regulations).
22
Judicial partition operates coercively because it can be unilaterally sought over the objections of other cotenants. While the co-tenants seeking partition in kind clearly desire the swap in question, the other co-tenants
may not.
23
Land readjustment is not well known in the United States but is used in many other countries. It operates
as a substitute for ordinary exercises of eminent domain. Although specifics vary, the basic idea is to reconfigure
a development area and return to the initial landowners property within that area that is at least as valuable as that
which was taken from them, along with a share of the increase in value associated with the development. See e.g.,
ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie
Needham, eds., 2007); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary versus In-Kind Remedies, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 188; Frank Schnidman, Land Assembly by Assembling People, SP006 ALI-ABA 351 (2009);
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these examples, an owner may primarily object to the initial deprivation, for
which she does not feel the in-kind payment adequately compensates, rather
than to the new grant of ownership. Nonetheless, forced compensation in
kind via ownership may be objectionable in its own right, if only for the
costs involved in liquidating or otherwise disposing of the interest.
Contractual or statutory provisions may require a party to buy a product
(or buy it back) if certain conditions occur.24 Recent examples include “putbacks” of bad housing loans,25 and efforts to make mortgagees foreclose on
properties that have been vacated by defaulting borrowers.26 Consider also
provisions that turn library book borrowers or video renters into owners
(with payment obligations) if they fail to return an item for a specified
period of time, and policies or laws that allow retail products to be returned
after their purchase, effectively forcing their repurchase. 27
Unrebuffed and Unrebuffable Transfers. Some unwanted acquisitions
arise through transfers from other parties that were not rebuffed in time, or
perhaps could not have been successfully rebuffed at all. Gifts, bequests,
and inheritances all require acceptance by the donee. Nonetheless, as long
as the property is valuable, acceptance may be readily inferred. 28 Because
disclaiming ownership will often come at some positive cost, unrebuffed
transfers can produce unwanted ownership. Factual disputes surrounding
acceptance may erupt if ownership turns out to be a losing proposition, as
where the owner is liable for significant environmental cleanup costs.29
George W. Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 URB. L. 1 (2000).
24
These put options may be explicit or they may be embedded in contractual or legal arrangements. On
embedded options, see, for example AYRES, supra note 5; Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded
Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM L. REV. 1428 (2004); George S. Geis,
An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1686 n.114 (2006).
25
See, e.g., Scott Suttell, Mortgage Giants Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Battle Banks on Who Gets Stuck with
Bad Housing Loans, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUSINESS, blog entry of Oct. 4, 2012, 2:00 pm,
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20121004/BLOGS03/121009895 ;[Nick Timiraos, Burdened by Bad
Loans, Banks Are Slow to Lend Now, WSJ., Oct. 4, 2012].
26
Mortgages in non-recourse jurisdictions have sometimes been viewed as granting a put option to sell one’s
home back to the mortgagee at the price of the outstanding loan balance. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D.
Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2009). The
characterization is imperfect, however, to the extent that mortgagees can refuse to foreclose. See infra note 23.
Recent efforts to force foreclosure would transform what is now a call option for the mortgagee into a (true) put
option held by the mortgagor.
27
This is a common feature in retail sales; many refund provisions effectively grant the buyer a put option.
Hyundai offered an interesting version of this option from early 2009 to early 2011: car buyers who lost their jobs
within one year of buying a Hyundai could sell it back, and Hyundai would cover any difference between the
outstanding loan balance on the car and the car’s trade-in value. See Peter Valdes-Dapena, Hyundai Won’t Buy
Your Car Back Anymore, CNNMoney, Mar. 30, 2011.
28
See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 874–75 (N.Y. 1986) (“Acceptance by the donee is essential to
the validity of an inter vivos gift, but when a gift is of value to the donee, as it is here, the law will presume an
acceptance on his part.”).
29
For example, acceptance was disputed in a case involving a dam site that turned out to require $40,000 in
repairs mandated by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Janian v. Barnes, 284
A.D.2d 717 (N.Y. 2001) (finding that the defendant had not expressly rejected a quitclaim deed and was therefore
the sole owner of the dam, barring some other defense to the transfer).
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Chattel property that is abandoned on one’s land by another party
without permission presents a kind of transfer that may be especially hard to
rebuff.30 Even though the initial dumping constitutes a trespass, once the
goods (or bads) are in place, they become the problem of the owner of the
premises. The theoretical ability to bring an action against the party who
abandoned the chattels is unlikely to translate into a meaningful practical
opportunity to force the removal of the goods. Self-help may be employed
to eject the offending item but only to the extent that one can do so without
trespassing on the property of someone else. Self-help may also be used to
keep such offending objects away in the first place (through the use of high
fences, posted guards, and so on) but at some positive cost.
Natural Occurrences. Natural occurrences can also produce ownership
relationships without any input on the part of the owner. The principle of
accession operates in a number of contexts to assign new interests to
holders of related interests.31 Thus, under the doctrine of ratione soli, wild
animals killed or captured on the land of the owner become the landowner’s
property.32 Accretion can deliver new increments of real estate to riparian
owners.33 And the doctrine of increase gives ownership of newborn animals
to the owner of the animal’s mother.34 These unsought acquisitions may
often be welcome, but they could easily be aversive for particular owners.
The potential burdens associated with such rules push questions about
the termination of ownership to the forefront. In a 1909 Georgia case, for
example, a court of appeals alluded to the law of increase in concluding that
humane destruction of a “worthless” dog must be permitted:
If it were the law that a person might not kill his own dog,
the ownership of one of these animals, especially in case it
were a bitch, would entail a considerable burden; for one
who found himself possessed of a worthless cur bitch would
be obliged to care for and support not only her, but also the
‘heirs of her body’ and all her ‘lineal descendants,’ which he
could not give away, even to the third and the fourth, yes
even to the thirty-third and thirty-fourth, generation; for
30
A related situation involves the purchase of real estate that contains unwanted chattel property. See text
accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
31
See generally Merrill supra note 17.
32
As Merrill explains, ratione soli is a competing principle to first possession, and was historically more
dominant in England than in the United States. See Merrill, supra note 17, at 470. The difference matters only to
the extent that private unenclosed lands are open to hunters, since exclusion rights would ensure that only the
landowner (or those granted permission by her) could capture or kill animals on the land. Id. Moreover, it would
seem that even a first possession rule would permit a hunter to abandon a captured or killed animal, making it the
property of the landowner.
33
See id. at 465-66.
34
Id. at 460.
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under the statute cruelty may consist in neglect as well as in
some overt act.35
2. Unwanted Retention
Owners may find themselves holding or using property beyond the point
where it generates positive returns, and even after it begins to impose a
burden.
Limits on Terminating Possession. Recent scholarship has explored the
limits on owners’ ability to unilaterally end their possessory relationship
with property through abandonment or destruction.36 Restrictions on
alienability can also make getting rid of property more costly or difficult,37
as can features of the property itself that render it less marketable.38 These
limits are important to the category of unwanted ownership in two ways.
First, even ownership that is initially fully voluntary can become aversive
over time, making blocked channels for ending the relationship significant
on their own in generating unwanted ownership. Second, the categories of
unwanted acquisition discussed above would have little bite were it not for
blockades to disposing of property cheaply thereafter.
The general common law rule that fee interests in real estate cannot be
abandoned has significant implications, as the recent housing crisis has
shown. Despite some efforts to force lenders to foreclose when mortgagors
vacate the premises and cease paying, defaulting mortgagors may be forced
to retain ownership and the obligations that follow from it—including
liability for homeowner association dues.39 A sale of the property is often
blocked by the fact that the mortgage balance far exceeds the likely sales
price. The inability of the homeowner to come up with the difference locks
her into ownership, unless the lender either agrees to a short sale or
35

Miller v. State, 63 S.E. 571, 573 (Ga. App. 1909).
Strahilevitz, supra note 6; Peñalver, supra note 6; Strahilevitz, supra note 7; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Unilateral Relinquishment of Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 125
(Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., 2011); see also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 79-80
(1997).
37
See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8.
38
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 8, at 1427-28 & n. 118 (distinguishing legal restrictions on alienability from
marketability constraints and discussing related literature). Ownership that is hard to end due to lack of
marketability or other non-legal barriers is sometimes described as “forced.” See, e.g., Bernard Benjamin
Hoffman, Jr., Forced Home Ownership (dissertation, Syracuse, 1967) (describing the situation of homeowners
who wish to leave their present home but are unable to do so due to various factors).
39
Mhari Saito, Banks Refusing to Take Back Foreclosed Properties, NPR, Mar. 3, 2009 (discussing the
possibility of legislation “that would force lenders to completely follow through with foreclosure or forgive the
homeowner’s debt”); John Gittelsohn, Homeowner Associations in Need of Cash Sue to Force Foreclosures,
Bloomberg.com, Aug. 23, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-24/homeowner-associations-in-needof-cash-sue-lenders-to-force-foreclosures.html (discussing “mortgage terminator” lawsuits brought by homeowner
associations against homeowners and lenders to collect unpaid association dues). Homeowner association dues
were at issue in Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), a leading case
holding that there is no right to abandon fee interests in real property.
36
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forecloses on the property—and it may legally choose to do neither.40
The ability to abandon chattel property is often also severely
constrained. Specific provisions restrict the ability to abandon certain kinds
of chattel property, such as automobiles41 and animals.42 More broadly,
there may be few legal options to discard chattels on the property of
others.43 The simplest examples are bans on littering. Although these
prohibitions are usually enforced with fines rather than by forcing the owner
to continue in possession, an interesting example of the latter approach can
be found in one Spanish town’s approach to pet waste: mailing dog feces
back to the errant owners.44
Limits on Terminating Use. Closely related to the unwanted retention of
property is the forced continuation of the property’s current use. For
example, rent control laws may effectively require that the property
continue in rental use, especially if coupled with other limitations that
preclude repossessing the property for personal use, converting it to any
other use, or destroying it.45 Historic preservation ordinances prohibiting
the destruction of improvements on property present a similar scenario.46
Here, keeping the underlying parcel requires keeping the structure as well.
While the entire property may be sold, the requirement that the use remain
unchanged and that the new owner engage in upkeep of the property limits
its marketability.
40
See, e.g., In re Cormier, 434 B.R. 222 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (finding “no authority under Massachusetts
law or the Bankruptcy Code to compel American [the mortgagee] to take immediate title to or possession of the
Property”). Land banks offer a possible way out of the conundrum by offering lenders a low-cost way to dispose
of the property, but may carry some drawbacks as well. See GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcomm. on Econ.
Policy, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Mortgage Foreclosures: Additional
Mortgage Servicer Actions Could Help Reduce the Frequency and Impact of Abandoned Foreclosures (Nov.
2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1193.pdf (examining the incidence of abandoned foreclosures and
assessing possible solutions, including land banks).
41
See, e.g., Conn. Code § 14-150 (making it illegal to leave a motor vehicle on the highway or on another
person’s property for more than 24 hours).
42
Animal protection laws vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For one compilation, see
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Protection Laws of the United States and Canada,
http://aldf.org/resources/advocating-for-animals/animal-protection-laws-of-the-united-states-of-america-andcanada/.
43
The fact that land cannot be legally abandoned means that the land of others must the site of a successful
abandonment—yet the land of another cannot be legally used for this purpose either without their implicit or
explicit consent. See Peñalver, supra note 6, at 203-07.
44
Suzanne Daley, Special Delivery, of Sorts, for Wayward Dog Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2013.
45
This is the situation that was described in the petition for certiorari in Harmon v. Kimmel, a case that
involved the application of New York’s rent stabilization laws to properties that were zoned only for residential
use, that were landmarked and hence could not be destroyed, and that could not be reclaimed for family use unless
a suitable alternative rental was provided to the tenants. Cert. Petition at 32-35. The Second Circuit rejected the
Harmons’ claim that the laws worked a taking of their property, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See
Harmon v. Markus, 412 Fed.Appx. 420 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied by Harmon v. Kimmel, 132 S. Ct. 1991 (2012).
46
See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5 th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 426 U.S. 905 (1976)
(prohibiting the destruction of a cottage adjacent to the landowner’s home in the historic French quarter, pursuant
to an architectural control ordinance designed to preserve the “tout ensemble” of the quarter); see also Carol M.
Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473,
507-08 (1981) (discussing the Maher case).
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Land use exactions and in “in lieu of” fees may similarly pressure the
continuation of existing uses. The California case of Ehrlich v. City of
Culver City offers an interesting example.47 There, the landowner had
closed its unprofitable tennis club after a string of financial losses and
sought approval for a new use. The City conditioned approval on (among
other things) the owner mitigating the loss of recreational opportunities in
the community by constructing four new municipal tennis courts or paying
a $280,000 fee.48 Although the court remanded for consideration of whether
the fee was proportionate under the Dolan standard, it indicated that the
withdrawal of recreational uses could impose public costs for which some
impact fee might be appropriate.49
“Use it or lose it” requirements similarly constrain owners by mandating
the active exercise of certain prerogatives of ownership. 50 These
requirements can be understood as limiting the (temporary) disposition of
property51 and may thereby produce a type of unwanted ownership.
Adverse possession imposes a similar, if weaker, requirement that
ownership be accompanied by acts characteristic of ownership (use or
monitoring), if one does not wish to risk dispossession.52 Here it is worth
flagging an important conceptual point that I will revisit below: once we
broaden the understanding of aversive ownership to encompass unwanted
aspects of ownership or unwanted duties attending to ownership, it becomes
difficult to bound the principle or to distinguish it from ownership more
generally.
B. Reasons for Aversion
Why might parties wish to avoid ownership? There are several
possibilities. First, ownership might be unwanted because it comes with a
47

Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
Id. at 434-35
49
Id. at 446 (“In short, it is well accepted in both the case and statutory law that the discontinuance of a
private land use can have a significant impact justifying a monetary exaction to alleviate it.”); see also id. at 44850 (discussing the standard of “rough proportionality” established by the Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1993), and remanding the case for further consideration under it).
50
See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property
Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 650–60, 681–83 (2008) (discussing “use or lose” provisions). Weaker penalties or
subsidies might also be designed to pressure property use. Recent examples include bills introduced by
Philadelphia City Council President Darrell L. Clarke to address neglected properties. See Troy Graham, Clarke
Plans Bill on Vacant Properties, PHILA. INQ., June 8, 2013 (describing a bill that would impose a “non-utilization
tax” of “10 percent of a property’s assessed value after it had been vacant for more than a year,” with increased
taxes kicking in for additional years of vacancy); Jan Ransom, Council Bills Aim to Make Vacant, Tax-Delinquent
Properties Profitable, Philly.com, Mar. 8, 2013 (describing a mortgage-forgiveness bill for residents below a
certain income level “who build housing [and] live on the property for five years).
51
See PENNER, supra note 36, at 79 (“[I]f we regard the idea that a right to exclusive use permits us to
decide never to use an object of property again, then it must encompass the lesser decision to forego using it for a
day or a month or a year. Such a decision is as much a disposition of the property as is its total abandonment.”).
52
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1122, 1130 (1985).
48
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payment obligation that exceeds what the property is worth to the owner.
Often, the owned item would be desirable if it could be obtained for free,
but not if it must be paid for at the specified rate. This is usually the case
when a put option is exercised to force a sale. The circumstances that cause
the option to be “in the money” for the option holder are typically ones that
also make the forced purchase a bad deal for the party against whom the
option is exercised. What is aversive is the price, not the good. Similarly,
many remedial applications of forced ownership—such as being required to
pay for land upon which one has innocently encroached—would not be
aversive (nor remedial) if the transfer were completed for free.
Second, ownership might be unwanted because it comes with liability
exposure. Expected liability might outstrip the expected benefits that will
flow from ownership, or exposure might simply present an unacceptable
level of risk to the owner (even though ownership would on the whole
present a positive expected value).53 It is most natural to think of this
exposure in terms of liability to third parties—whether governmental
entities who impose taxes or environmental clean-up obligations, collectives
who demand residential association fees, or individuals who suffer harms
while on one’s premises. But ownership may also expose the owner herself
to uncompensated harms.54 These harms may range from small, certain,
and chronic (the abiding ugliness of an unwanted gift,55 the constant upkeep
requirements of a suboptimally large lawn) to large, uncertain, and acute
(the chance of fatal exposure to dangerous property conditions).
Third, ownership might be unwanted because it will require costly
transfer or disposal efforts that exceed any value that the owner can realize
as a result.56 Where practical barriers to transfer or disposal exist, legal
limits need not be present to make ownership aversive if the property itself
is unwanted or expected to become so. Some motivation must still be
posited for the aversion to the property itself, however, to explain the desire
to transfer or dispose of it. Often the notion of liability exposure, broadly
construed, will provide the answer. Ownership carries an opportunity cost,
demanding time, space, attention, or effort that the owner might prefer to
use in another way. In other cases, a payment obligation associated with the
forced purchase generates pressure to liquidate, either because that
53
The latter situation will be most likely where robust insurance markets do not exist, whether for adverse
selection reasons or otherwise, or (what amounts to the same thing) where part of the risk takes a form that cannot
be compensated with money (such as the guilt one would feel if a houseguest suffered an injury on one’s
property).
54
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 167 n.26 (1970) (using the term “liability” broadly to
capture impacts that are left to fall on victims of accidents).
55
See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 366 (describing “tyrannical heirlooms”).
56
Even where the owner expects to realize positive value from the disposition of the property, the ownership
may still be unwanted relative to a monetary award to which one might otherwise be entitled and which one might
prefer. Here, the cost of disposal or transfer represents the cost of transforming the less preferred in-kind item
into the preferred currency of cash.
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obligation has caused a financial shortfall, or because the owner does not
want to bear the investment risk associated with holding onto the property.
Finally, ownership might be aversive for reasons relating to autonomy
or personhood. The things that one owns are in some sense an extension of
the self and constitutive of one’s identity.57 Just as having one’s personally
significant property wrested away can interfere with self-definition, so too
can having unwanted things thrust upon one.58 Liability exposure is one
reason that people might not wish to be personally associated with things.
But the objection to ownership may go deeper, given the potential for
people to identify with the things they own and hence with the harms that
they inflict.59 Property holdings can also clash with one’s sense of self.
Consider, for example, a property owner in the American South who
discovers upon clearing her rural tract that it contains an abandoned bus
from the mid-20th century marked with segregated seating instructions.60
This difficult-to-remove bus may become a source of shame to the
landowner, who wants no association with its racist message.61
C. Taking Stock
This brief tour of existing forms of unwanted ownership has established
that the phenomenon exists: sometimes people do not want the things they
own. Their reasons may be idiosyncratic or personal and will not
necessarily track the asset’s net present value. The discussion above has
also established that the law not only tolerates the existence of unwanted
ownership, but also actively produces it through a variety of doctrines.
However, the pattern of examples suggests that certain features tend to
accompany unwanted ownership as it exists on the ground. Taking note of
these features will help to develop the basis and limits of forced ownership.
First, ownership is rarely forced in a full and permanent sense, insofar
57
See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, The Value of Ownership, 9 J. POLIT. PHIL. 404 (2001) (examining
connections between ownership and identity).
58
See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 36, at 79 (“One ought not to be saddled with a relationship to a thing that
one does not want . . . .”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 602 (noting the interference with autonomy
inherent in a forced purchase).
59
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 979-81
(1992) (explore the relationship between property and the self using an example in which one’s vase blows out the
window through no fault of one’s own and falls on a passerby).
60
See Jodi A. Barnes & Carl Steen, Archaeology and Heritage of the Gullah People: A Call to Action, 1 J.
AFRICAN DIASPORA ARCHAEOLOGY & HERITAGE 167, 201 fig. 11 (2012) (photograph showing a segregated
seating notice inside a bus abandoned on rural property near Edgefield, South Carolina).
61
The effects of repugnant things may linger even after they are physically removed. A powerful example is
related in Paul Auster’s memoir. He describes moving into a house and discovering some boxes of books that had
been left behind by the previous owners. To his disgust, he finds that the collection includes pro-Nazi tracts and a
volume defending anti-Semitism. He hauls the books to the town dump, but their taint remains, ultimately forcing
him to move out. As he explains, addressing his former self: “It wasn’t possible to live in a house with such
books in it. . . . but even after you had got rid of the books, it still wasn’t possible to live there. You tried, but it
simply wasn’t possible.” PAUL AUSTER, A WINTER’S JOURNAL (2012).
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as it is usually possible to avoid it by incurring some cost or paying some
penalty. Even if the law purports to force ownership without any escape
hatch, compelled possession is more difficult and unusual to enforce
injunctively than compelled nonpossession. This asymmetry makes it likely
that only financial responsibility would follow from shirking the duties of
ownership.62 Ownership avoidance opportunities, whether de jure or de
facto, are significant. They may help to mitigate the costs to unwilling
owners of unwanted ownership, but they may also reduce the benefits that
society can realize through such (attempted) compulsion.
Second, unwanted ownership typically follows some earlier, identifiable
choice (often, the choice to enter into some desired ownership relationship).
This makes it possible to recast unwanted ownership as a wanted ownership
bundle that merely contains some aversive elements—as ownership
generally does. Limits on abandonment offer a clear example. By becoming
an owner of real property in the first instance, one has effectively signed up
to remain an owner until one can find someone else to accept the job;
ownership today is bundled with ownership tomorrow. Ownership that
begins involuntarily can also be characterized as a bundled choice, insofar
as the ownership obligation is tied to some earlier decision that might be
characterized as voluntary, whether to obtain some other ownership interest
(such as the mother of the animal one now owns against one’s will), or to
engage in some act or omission for which ownership follows remedially or
by operation of law.
These observations make it hard to pin down when we are dealing with
a case of involuntary ownership, as opposed to just ownership. Consider
the law of increase, which makes the offspring of one’s female animals
one’s own. If circumstances exist in which an owner, Owen, would prefer
not to be the owner of a newborn calf recently born to his cow Bossy, can
we say that the law has forced ownership of the calf on Owen?
On one account, yes: the ownership came unbidden and is (by
hypothesis) aversive. On another, though, we might point out that Owen
voluntarily acquired Bossy (or perhaps voluntarily acquired Bossy’s
mother) and that one of the incidents of owning Bossy is owning Bossy’s
offspring. Owning Bossy’s calf may be an aversive thread within the
voluntary ownership of Bossy, but is it any different from being forced to
buy food for Bossy, or “owning” the results of damage that Bossy causes if
she strays onto someone else’s property? Is Owen forced to be an owner
62
The informal “abandonment” of real property by a judgment-proof owner may be understood in this way,
even though true abandonment is a legal impossibility. Similar points have been made in critiquing the
distinctions among property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules pioneered in Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972). See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the
Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 852-53 (1997) (observing that these “rules” governing transfers of entitlements
may be broken).

16

Fennell

[6-Nov-13

(of the calf), or is Owen just forced to accept the responsibilities that
naturally go with ownership (of Bossy)?63
There is no obvious answer without resort to external principles about
what ownership should entail. Property mavens will notice that this inquiry
is the flip side of the baseline problem that emerges in regulatory takings
contexts: when owner Olive is prohibited from expanding her cottage,
which is located on wetlands, has something been “taken” from her, or is
the law instead merely recognizing the inherent limits on her title?64 The
questions quickly devolve into normative ones. Because it is always
possible to trace the imposition of an unwanted element of ownership to
some prior voluntary act, the question becomes one of which coercive
linkages or bundlings should be forbidden, permitted, or required.
I will return to this issue of bundling below. For now, an observation
suffices: It is no accident that the existing examples of unwanted ownership
tend to involve relatively tight causal connections between earlier choices
and later ownership obligations. Without a theory of forcings to rely on—
one that might include the prospect of compensation—ownership is unlikely
to be imposed except in instances where the associated burdens appear
normatively justified. These are likely to also be circumstances in which
the resulting ownership bundles appear coherent.
II. WHY FORCE OWNERSHIP?
Why would the law ever force an individual to start or maintain an
ownership relationship that the individual herself did not find desirable? At
first blush, the question has an obvious answer. If ownership makes a party
responsible for making payments, accepting liability, or bearing the costs of
disposal or transfer, it might seem self-evident why there would be a social
interest in imposing it over the owner’s wishes. But on closer inspection,
the choice of mandating ownership requires more exploration. I start with
some observations about the “ownership strategy” and how its
consequences vary from those produced by a system of damage payments. I
will then turn to some reasons why society might prefer to impose
63

In other words, where are the natural or logical seams in ownership located? Eduardo Peñalver explores
one aspect of this question in observing that one can unilaterally abandon the benefit (only) of a servitude on land,
since this does not mean walking away from obligations one has taken on. Peñalver, supra note 6, at 212. He
continues, contrasting the case of fee ownership for which no abandonment is available: “When ownership is
conceived of as a social practice permeated by obligation, all property labors under a sort of servitude for the
benefit of the communities in which the property is situated. . . . And, just as the owners of servient estates cannot
unilaterally walk away from the obligations imposed by servitudes, the unilateral abandonment of property,
especially land, is equally problematic.” Id. at 213. This analysis suggests that ownership is an undivided and
eternal whole that cannot be temporally broken at a point of the owner’s (unilateral) choosing. Rather, the owner
must make an appropriate deal with some third party to accept the associated burdens. Yet this still does not
determine the content of those burdens—for that, we need to resort to some external normative theory.
64
Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 612-14 (discussing baseline issues in charging for givings as
well as paying for takings).

6-Nov-13]

FORCINGS

17

ownership.
A. The Ownership Strategy
Henry Smith has helpfully focused attention on the “exclusion strategy”
that property rights typically employ.65 Boundary exclusion creates a
protected realm in which an owner can access resources free of outside
invasion, and within which she can use self-help to keep her own impacts
inside and those of others outside.66 The exclusion strategy works in tandem
with governance strategies that help to protect the outside world from the
activities of the property owner, and vice versa.67 For example, property’s
exclusion strategy allows a factory owner to place a ring fence around the
plant to protect widgets from being spirited away, while the complementary
governance strategy imposes liability for pollution that spills over the
property line.68
This influential picture of property is useful but incomplete.
Ownership also, and crucially, involves a certain allocation of risk.69 To
own something is to bear outcomes—outcomes that may be influenced only
probabilistically through one’s own inputs.70 Exclusion backed by
governance constructs and controls the environment in which inputs are
made and outcomes are realized and contained. But risk remains. As a
result, owning outcomes is a very different thing than being directly
assigned expected outcomes. The difference usually goes unnoticed because
owners self-select into property ownership when they find the risks worth
bearing and leave ownership when this is no longer the case. With freely
alienable and marketable property that is protected by property rules, an
owner can choose at any time whether to select actual outcomes (become or
65

Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1755-57 (2004).
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965,
1012 (2004); Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1446 (2007).
67
See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002)
68
More recently, Thomas Merrill has outlined “the property strategy,” which focuses on “the nature of the
prerogatives given to those called owners.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061,
2066 (2012).
69
To be an owner is to be the residual claimant on whatever aspects of a resource have not been parceled out
to others. This role should be assigned based on the ability to control those sources of variance. See YORAM
BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 78 (2d ed. 1997) (“A party is expected to assume more of
the variability, that is, become more of a residual claimant as its effect on the mean outcome increases.”).
However, given imperfect insurance markets, there will typically remain additional sources of variance that are
not under the owner’s control but that nonetheless influence the outcomes she will experience.
70
Smith recognizes the significance to property ownership of the ability to place and collect on bets. Henry
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 984 (2004); Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1729 (2004). But because his discussion assumes that the
bets are voluntarily undertaken, it does not address the possibility that ownership could create aversive risk
arrangements. Likewise, Merrill’s explication of “the property strategy” recognizes the incentive effects that
accompany making the owner the residual claimant, but devotes little space to downside risk exposure. See
Merrill, supra note 68, at 2092-93 (suggesting that insurance and social safety nets largely address concerns about
risk).
66
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remain an owner) or expected outcomes (cash out now).
There are two situations where the difference between expected
outcomes and actual outcomes is starkly presented. One is when ownership
is terminated involuntarily, as through eminent domain. The other is when
ownership is forced. In the former situation, one loses the right to try one’s
hand at getting actual outcomes that exceed expected outcomes—although
one may also be saved from the risk of getting actual outcomes that are
lower than expected outcomes.71 Forced ownership effectuates a different
swap: one is made to bear actual outcomes, rather than simply being
charged with expected outcomes. It is a different thing to pay damages
(even “permanent damages” designed to cover projected future impacts)
than it is to be exposed to ongoing liability. The two situations present
different risk profiles and incentive structures.
It is easier to grasp what the ownership strategy does by examining its
metaphorical application to a different area of law—tort. Arthur Ripstein
has developed a concept of “risk ownership” that makes people owners (in
some sense) of the risks they create by acting in the world. 72 On this view,
actors are properly saddled with (some) actual outcomes that flow from
their behavior, not the expected value of the risks they generate. This, after
all, is what it means to be an owner.
The bite of this approach can be seen in its application to the problem of
“moral luck.”73 A moral luck conundrum arises when identical inputs
(equally inattentive driving, say, or leaving a baby unattended in a bathtub
for an equal amount of time) produce dramatically different outcomes (a
catastrophic accident in one case, and nothing at all in another).74 If only
voluntary human inputs (and not randomly generated outcomes) carry moral
significance, then it becomes difficult to justify the law’s (and society’s)
divergent treatment of actors in such pairs of cases. The negligent driver or
caregiver who causes a death is vilified and subjected to severe legal
consequences, while her equally culpable doppelgänger who luckily avoids
causing harm walks away unscathed.
Viewing the generator of a risk as its “owner” offers a way to
understand or at least normalize this apparent anomaly. Letting outcomes
71

The statement in the text assumes that expected returns get built into the fair market value standard used to
determine the adequacy of compensation.
72
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999)
73
See RIPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 72-74 (1999). For discussion of moral luck, see e.g. Bernard Williams,
Moral Luck, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 at 20 (Cambridge U. Press 1981); Thomas Nagel,
Moral Luck, in Mortal Questions 24 (Cambridge U. Press 1979); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and
Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (David G. Owen ed., Oxford U. Press 1995);
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007).
74
See Waldron, supra note 73, at 387 (giving the example of two momentarily distracted drivers, one of
whom collides with a motorcyclist and the other of whom proceeds without incident); Nagel, supra note 73, at 3031 (“If one negligently leaves the bath running with the baby in it, one will realize, as one bounds up the stairs
toward the bathroom, that if the baby has drowned one has done something awful, whereas if it has not one has
merely been careless.”).
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(both catastrophic and benign) fall on risk generators is arguably no more
odd than leaving the upside and downside risks of a vegetable garden or a
shopping development on an owner, even though external forces will
determine whether certain acts of cultivation or neglect translate into
success or failure. We do not usually agonize over the moral luck
implications of the fact that one crop or mall succeeds while another fails;
this is just the gamble that an owner takes.75
The ownership concept sits uneasily in the tort framework, however, as
Ripstein recognizes.76 Tort risks are typically not bounded by exclusion
rights in the way that property tends to be. This fact deprives actors of
control over how risks will play out, 77 and requires that tort law synthesize
some conceptual substitutes for physical boundaries; these are embodied in
doctrines like proximate cause, foreseeability, and duty—and, in most
contexts, the idea of negligence.78 There is also the vexing problem that
potential benefits generated when acting in the world are considerably less
amenable to ownership under tort law than are potential harms.79 Tort
doctrines may nonetheless be understood as forcing ownership of a subset
of risks thought to align with the boundaries of the actor’s own benefit
catchment system.
Whether or not one finds the idea of risk ownership to be a satisfying
normative answer to moral luck concerns or a helpful descriptive tool for
understanding how tort law works, the exercise of considering it does cast
new light on the meaning of (actual) ownership. Property can be
conceptualized as “a leaky bucket of gambles.”80 It delivers not a basket of
expected outcomes, but rather the outcomes themselves, over time. The
bucket is leaky and prone to sloshing, however: not all inputs are under the
75

Tony Honoré similarly casts tort liability as the outcome of a series of gambles in which most people win
more than they lose. Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530, 539-41 (1988).
76
See RIPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 47 (noting the indeterminacy of ownership “in a world of risks”).
77
Exclusion offers a way of controlling the background against which risks play out and the identity and
characteristics of parties exposed to the risks. For example, members of a household without any young children
can keep prescription medicines that are not in child-proof containers out on a countertop without thereby creating
any significant risk, assuming no children are invited into the household and ordinary exclusion measures are
taken to keep neighborhood children from wandering in unattended.
78
While strict liability offers perhaps the clearest case of such “outcome-responsibility,” see Honoré, supra
note 75 at 541, we can understand a negligence regime as merely constraining the set of outcomes for which one
will be responsible. Strict liability embeds constraints on liability-producing outcomes as well, albeit along lines
other than fault, such as causation. Another way to put the point is to say that “owning” all the risk one creates
would place actors in unmanageable “common ownership” schemes with large sectors of the population. Limits
are clearly necessary. Yet because the limits on liability that the law constructs are not the boundaries that an
owner selects, risk ownership is an interesting form of forced ownership (to the extent we think of it as ownership
at all).
79
See, e.g., Porat, supra note 10. If all of the costs were charged to one’s account and none of the benefits,
then there would be too little engagement in activities that do not cause expected harm on net. Indeed, one
compelling rationale for limiting the scope of liability is to account for the positive spillovers associated with
everyday activities. For an interesting discussion that focuses on the “duty” element’s role in providing this
limitation, see Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, Boston Univ. School of Law, Law
and Economics Working Paper No. 06-04 (February 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=887147.
80
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 66, at 1405, 1442-43.
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owner’s control, and not all outcomes get fully charged to the owner. Still,
ownership endeavors to achieve a reasonably well-aligned pairing of inputs
and outcomes.81
Ownership thus amounts to a container within which outcomes are
one’s responsibility, and for which one bears any attendant risks one has not
managed to offload to others.82 Tort doctrines and governance mechanisms
may stretch this container to capture more of the normatively relevant
outcomes or avoid capturing normatively irrelevant outcomes.83 But these
same objectives might at times be pursued by extending or forcing
ownership itself.
B. Ownership’s Edge
Understanding that ownership’s basic strategy entails responsibility for
outcomes, not inputs, helps explain the motivation for forced ownership.
Identifying an owner means something different from imposing a charge: it
is an answer to the question “whose problem is this?”84 There are sensible
reasons why the law might choose to answer that question, rather than a
series of other questions about the nature, extent, probable solution, and
expected value of the problem. The sections below offer a set of (somewhat
overlapping) rationales for requiring ownership. Taken together, they focus
on the potential for outcome responsibility, when channeled into particular
patterns or broken into particular bundles, to address information and
incentive problems.
1. Economizing on Information
One reason for forcing ownership is to economize on the costs of
gathering and using information. Consider trover, which requires a party
who has converted the property of another to purchase that property. It
might seem at first that a damage award would serve just as well, and
81
Achieving a perfect alignment would be unduly costly, but property should endeavor to charge or credit
outcomes to the owner when it can do so cost-effectively. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967) (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains
of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”).
82
As the common availability of homeowner’s insurance suggests, owners need not personally bear all risks.
The offloading of risk can be conceptualized as the division of ownership. See BARZEL, supra note 69, at 6-7
(observing that the supplier of service to a photocopier “is a residual claimant from the servicing operation” and
hence a partial owner in the economic sense).
83
Thus, for example, some property-mimicking doctrines in tort require or encourage actors to behave as if
they are the single owner, even though they actually are not. For example, the doctrine of private necessity allows
a party to appropriate the property of another to preserve property or life, but she must pay for the damage thereby
caused.
84
See RIPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 47 (observing that after a normative account of the proper distribution of
risks has been established, “talk of people owning risks and misfortunes is simply a way of spelling out the idea
expressed in such familiar idioms as ‘that’s not my problem.’”).
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indeed the remedy of replevin offers just such an alternative.85 An
advantage of forcing ownership, however, is that it sidesteps the need to
calculate damages. Payment is based on the fair market value of the
undamaged item; the transfer of the thing itself will credit back any
remaining value to the new owner. 86 Disagreements about the extent of the
damage need not be entertained, nor must the erstwhile owner bear the risk
that the condition of the thing will deteriorate further as a result of
additional hidden vulnerabilities (such as hairline fractures in a vase).
In certain nuisance contexts, the forced purchase of affected property
could operate similarly: the property might be forcibly transferred at its
(unpolluted) fair market value, at the election of the current owners. 87 What
is notable about this solution from an information cost perspective is that it
does not require calculating damages in advance, or returning to court over
time as consequences unfold. 88 The new single owner of the consolidated
parcel will also be expected to make optimal decisions about how to
coordinate conflicting land uses going forward.
In the examples just given, the problem to which ownership was offered
as a response was relatively well defined: a damaged object, a polluted
parcel. But the information cost savings associated with the ownership
strategy become even more important when the nature of the problems
coming down the pike are as yet undefined. The unknown and unknowable
nature of future problems contributes to what we might identify as a
generalized “fear of the unowned” in property theory. Gaps in seisin are not
permitted for real property under the common law, and the same rule
applied to chattels until the sixteenth century.89 A likely reason was to
make sure there was always someone who was responsible for the property,
and to whom liability could attach if necessary.90
85

See supra note 14, and accompanying text.
See Epstein, supra note 17, at 850-51 (“Once the chattel is damaged, it is tricky to figure out what
damages are needed to make the plaintiff whole, so that the long-established election of remedy allows the
plaintiff simply to liquidate his original investment for cash. The remedy of forced purchase requires the
defendant, quite simply, to pick up the pieces when the chattel is destroyed and to take the up and down of its
value when the chattel is taken.”).
87
The literature on put options in the nuisance context has generally contemplated not the forced purchase of
a possessory interest in the property, but rather the forced purchase of, say, the entitlement to pollute. It has
accordingly focused on a different kind of informational advantage: the capacity of the exercise of the put option
to reveal information about which party values a given entitlement, such as the right to emit pollutants, more
highly. See AYRES, supra note 5, at 18-27. As a form of liability rule, put options harness information just as call
options do, but may be preferred for distributive or other reasons. See id. In the approach discussed in the text,
the forced purchase of the possessory interest precedes a series of decisions that the new owner of the
consolidated tract will make about how and whether to operate the factory; these decisions made by a single
owner, rather than the exercise of the put option itself, will reveal which of two or more conflicting land uses is
more valuable.
88
These advantages may, of course, be overwhelmed by other disadvantages of the approach. The goal here
is to focus on unique advantages of ownership, not to suggest this is likely to be the all-things-considered best
remedial course.
89
See A.H. Hudson, Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common Law? 100 L.Q. REV. 110, 118 (1984).
90
Id.
86
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These rationales relate closely to the risk-bearing and incentive aspects
of ownership, which will be developed below. But they find an additional
footing in information cost savings by economizing on the very task of
finding out who is in a good position to bear risk or respond to incentives.
The ownership strategy farms out that entire set of problems, leaving the
owner to decide what to do about them. By limiting the ways in which
people can rid themselves of both chattels and (especially) real property, the
law tries to channel property reassignment into forums in which information
costs are bearable. In the meantime, owners are kept paired with their
properties, which reduces the costs of learning about their status.
To say that it is useful to have some owner of record does not, of course,
make a case for the current method for picking out who shall serve in that
capacity. Gaps in seisin could be prevented equally well if unwanted
property could be decisively ceded to, say, an agency of the state.91 Where
property is objectively negative in value, an auction might be held to see
who would accept the property at the lowest price.92 Some of these
approaches might be good solutions in certain contexts, as will be discussed
below. Yet all of them cost something to implement. Letting ownership lay
where it falls (just like letting liability lay where it falls) has the immediate
edge of avoiding the need for society to incur costs identifying a better
owner.
2. Dispersing Obligations
Ensuring that land remains owned does more than satisfy a societal
sense of order. It also maintains a platform for imposing obligations.93
While the social obligations accompanying property ownership have
received a great deal of recent attention,94 unwanted ownership pushes us to
consider why these obligations would ever be imposed in kind. Here
another aspect of the information cost story becomes relevant: ownership’s
ability to capitalize on the advantages of dispersed information gathering
91
See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 394-95 (discussing civil law countries that permit relinquishment of real
property to the state).
92
See, e.g., HERBERT INHABER, SLAYING THE NIMBY DRAGON 41-69 (1998) (providing an accessible
account of how a reverse Dutch auction can be used allocate bads); Herbert Inhaber, Market-Based Solution to the
Problem of Nuclear and Toxic Waste Disposal, 41 J. AIR & WASTE MGT. ASSOC. 808, 812-15 (1991) (proposing
such an auction approach for siting waste); Michael O’Hare, “Not on My Block You Don’t”: Facility Siting and
the Strategic Importance of Compensation. 25 Public Policy 407, 438-56 (1977) (analyzing auction approaches to
facility siting).
93
See Peñalver, supra note 6, at 213 (suggesting that the affirmative obligations that accompany ownership
explain common law limits on abandonment).
94
Several accounts of this approach were presented in a 2009 symposium devoted to the topic. See, e.g.,
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009);
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009); Joseph William Singer, Democratic
Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). See also Ezra
Rosser, Essay, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. _ (2013)
(describing and critiquing various strands of the progressive property movement).
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and monitoring.95
Pervasive private land ownership creates a web of location-specific
obligors who can be called upon to collectively accomplish large-scale
tasks, like clearing a city’s entire sidewalk system of snow.96 Many of these
tasks could be collectively provided and the owners charged, but giving
each owner responsibilities over their own location offers a flexible and
responsive system that can be scaled up or down and to which new duties
can be added as needed. Significantly, the system takes advantage of
dispersed information and localized monitoring.97 Similarly, private
measures to safeguard property, such as deadbolts and fences, can also
reduce the cost of public enforcement (relative to a baseline in which the
land is unowned or publicly owned).98 Again, the ability to engage in
flexible, context specific measures based on local information may make
private enforcement a useful complement to public enforcement.
The widespread localized monitoring that accompanies dispersed
private ownership also generates expectations among third parties that help
to sustain social order. Presumptively owned property may be less likely to
be vandalized or broken into, on the assumption someone is looking after
it.99 Likewise, the assumption that property is owned, and not up for grabs,
can prevent wasteful or dangerous races to establish new ownership.100
Warding off these acts is socially desirable; they can have harmful
spillovers, in addition to potentially dissipating the value of the property.
Of course, the social harms of non-ownership are not necessarily
avoided through forced ownership. People can and do vacate and neglect
their properties even if the law continues to recognize them as owners. If
they are judgment proof, they may shirk their obligations as owners with
relative impunity.101 Similarly, dangerous and wasteful races can be
95
Thus, the law may have an interest in picking out owners who will serve these functions. This might be
used to explain, for example, the residency and use requirements associated with the Homestead Act. See
BARZEL, supra note 69, at 121-23 (suggesting that homesteading restrictions might be explained as a means “to
induce settlers’ self-protection against raids where such protection was cheaper than direct protection by the
state,” and “to ensure that the land would actually be densely occupied”).
96
See Larissa M. Katz, Governing Through Owners, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2051 (2012).
97
See id. at 2041-42, 2050 (giving an example in which a theater assigns each person a seat and charges her
with putting out any fires that break out under that seat, thereby producing a “system of fire control for the entire
theater”).
98
Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of Property Rights, 160
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1927 (2012) (making the related point that the availability of public enforcement may create moral
hazard as to private protective measures).
99
See Hudson, supra note 89, at 117-18 (discussing vandalism as a possible risk with unowned property).
100
Costly races to establish ownership are easy to envision with a first-in-time rule of physical possession.
See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 374-75; id. at 409-11 (suggesting that a different first in time rule, such as
granting rights to the first person to post a reply on a message board, would address concerns about “lawless
races”). Other ownership protocols may still produce deadweight losses, if less dramatic ones, as multiple people
attempt to simultaneously fulfill the requirements for ownership.
101
Legal responsibility may have some effect even on the judgment proof, insofar as they may hope or
expect to not remain so forever. Ownership also confronts owners with the opportunity cost of failing to make
valuable use of the property, if such is possible. Even a largely theoretical responsibility for the downsides
associated with the property might cause owners to pay attention to the upsides as well.
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produced not only by unowned things, but also by things that an owner
offers to transfer at a below-market price.102 However, it is possible that
ownership may operate on owners as a kind of moral suasion that causes
them to act more responsibly toward the owned item. 103 Moreover, even if
individual owners fall down on the job, the assumption that dispersed,
concerned monitors are paying attention and looking out for property may
create a kind of herd immunity that pushes back disorder.104 This rationale
falls apart, however, if property neglect becomes obvious and widespread—
as may occur when involuntary ownership makes up a larger market share
of all ownership.
3. Consolidating Complements
Sometimes it is more important to get a complementary set of property
rights into the same hands than it is to get individual components into the
highest-valuing hands.105 Although parties might be expected to voluntarily
put together complementary bundles in most cases, sometimes intervention
in the form of forced ownership plays a role.
Accession and mistaken improver cases offer some of the simplest and
clearest examples. It is obvious that a canvas and the artwork painted on it
should end up in the same ownership, just as it is obviously preferable to
have an entire building and the land under it end up in the same hands.
Because these situations present bilateral monopolies that may make it
difficult for the parties involved to negotiate solutions, unilateral transfers
are likely to be attractive alternatives. Forcing one party to sell to the other
is one alternative, but so too is forcing a party to buy from the other—and
the latter might in some cases seem normatively preferable. Indeed, it is not
uncommon to offer the encroached-upon party a choice between such
102
For example, the below-market pricing common on “Black Friday” has produced tramplings and other
outbreaks of violence. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden & Angela Macropoulos, Wal-Mart Employee Trampled to
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008; James Serna Black Friday Melee on Video at Georgia Wal-Mart, Trampling
in Texas, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2012.
103
Maintaining the ownership relationship could also influence the owner’s valuation of the thing in
question, which could in turn affect behavior regarding it. Although the nature, causes, and indeed existence of an
“endowment effect” has been the subject of extensive recent debate, there is an observable real-world gap between
the amount someone will pay to acquire something anew and the amount that one would accept to give the thing
up—a gap that may have something to do with certain facets of ownership. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Sarah F.
Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935,
1941-49 (2008) (reviewing the literature on the endowment effect). Whether and how such an effect would apply
where the property is unwanted has not to my knowledge been studied.
104
For example, a few unlocked cars or apartment doors in a sea of carefully secured properties will be
unlikely to attract casual thieves or vandals, because the returns to trying every door are so low. Indeed, a
nontrivial number of people subscribe to a “no lock” philosophy. See Joyce Wadler, The No Lock People, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010 (reporting on the phenomenon of people who regularly choose not to lock the doors to their
homes, including some residents of New York and other major cities).
105
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. &
ECON. S77, S92-99 (2011) (emphasizing the need to attend to the content of property packages, given positive
transaction costs).
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remedies: buy out or be bought out.
Many of the ways that law assigns rights to previously unowned
resources can be understood through the lens of complementarity as well.
The law of increase and accretion are good examples—property is added to
proximate or logically related existing holdings. Although instances could
exist in which the interests will be more valuable if split apart, these are rare
enough to make it efficient for the property system to make the assignments
in the way that it does—even at the cost of sometimes mis-assigning
resources.106 More generally, default property packages, which can be
costly to break apart, are arguably designed to reflect complementarities.
Other policies that pressure or encourage ownership can often be
explained by complementarities. For example, New Jersey’s bundling of the
right to defeat a variance with the purchase of the property for which the
variance was sought may be understood as a way to force information about
whether complementarities are present.107 Complementarities that inure to
the benefit of the larger community can explain prohibitions on the
destruction of historic properties under the tout ensemble doctrine.108
4. Aligning Incentives
Some unwanted ownership can be understood as buttressing the selfenforcing incentive system that private property is thought to embody. A
standard example of (or metaphor for) the incentive alignment potential of
property ownership is that of “reaping where one has sown.” Simple
agrarian illustrations are popular, because they present a plausible scenario
in which the benefits and burdens associated with one’s acts are confined to
the physical plot one owns.109 The farmer in the example owns her own
labor and the land; property law assigns her the crops that result from
mixing these elements with inputs that she also owns, such as seeds and
fertilizer. There are no significant externalities in the story. Whether
property operates in this manner, however, depends crucially on the way in
which ownership packages are scaled and defined.
If we posit instead a “flyaway” crop that predictably lands a quarter mile
southwest of where it is sown, the story does not work so well, unless the
property is redefined to include the catchment area, or the crops themselves
can somehow be associated with their sower.110 We cannot get incentive
106
Merrill offers a somewhat different explanation, that the law uses the past ownership of a related interest
as a proxy for identifying a fit owner. Merrill, supra note 17, at 488-91.
107
See text accompanying note 20, supra.
108
See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
109
These examples thus predominantly feature “small events,” to use Robert Ellickson’s nomenclature. See
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1325, 1327-30 (1993).
110
Cf. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (distinctive harpoon markings allowed whales to be identified
with the harpooning whaler, despite the use of bomb lance technology that did not keep the whale physically
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alignment by allowing the crop landing zone to be owned on its own, just as
we cannot get incentive alignment if the crops stay put on the owned land
but sprout noxious traveling spores whose effects are not charged back to
the owner. Property boundaries must be set in a way that produces incentive
alignment, or must be buttressed with governance structures that stand in
for physical boundaries where the latter cannot realistically be employed.111
Property’s social value, in other words, depends on package construction.
Some unwanted ownership, then, may involve elements added to a
given ownership package to better align incentives. If small properties
enable more cross-boundary externalities, larger properties might be
mandated. If short time slices of ownership lead to dealing in a presentfocused way with the land, longer time slices may be mandated. If
introducing rental housing or recreational opportunities into an area and
then withdrawing them will visit terrible harms on the community, then
keeping the use in place for a period of time may be mandated (even if it
means that fewer owners choose to provide those opportunities initially).
Ownership bundles may also be constructed to moderate access to local
public goods or common pool resources. The Tiebout hypothesis is built on
the idea that procuring residential services also means purchasing a basket
of local public goods and services.112 The idea of tying ownership
obligations to common resource access is built into other observed
arrangements as well, including cattle “wintering rules” used in some Swiss
villages, which prohibit sending more cows to the grazing lands than one
can feed during the winter,113 and medieval common field arrangements that
scatter individually owned farming strips within a seasonal grazing
commons.114
III. CHARTING FORCINGS
The discussion to this point has suggested why ownership that is
privately unwanted might nonetheless be socially valuable. This Part
examines how forcings fit conceptually into the overall scheme of private
ownership and state power.
A. Takings, Givings, Forcings, Relievings
The government can reassign ownership of a given piece of property in
tethered to the whaling boat.
111
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 67.
112
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
113
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 62 (1990).
114
See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
131, 146-54 (2000).
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four basic ways: by exercising the eminent domain power (takings), by
transferring property to willing parties (givings), by compelling ownership
(forcings), or by accepting transfers of property from parties who do not
wish to own it (relievings).115 Takings, givings, forcings and relievings
could occur alone or in various combinations as governmental entities
attempt to optimize land use. Table 1 sets out the domains within which
each of these moves would be minimally plausible as a normative and
logical matter.116

Table 1: Domains of Government Action
Ownership
(By a Nonowner) Is
Socially Beneficial

Ownership
(By Current Owner)
Is Socially Costly

Ownership Is
Privately Beneficial
(Wanted)

I. GIVINGS

II. TAKINGS
(and other coercive
dispossessions)

Ownership Is
Privately Costly
(Unwanted)

III. FORCINGS

IV. RELIEVINGS

The distinction between Table 1’s top and bottom rows goes to whether
ownership in a given instance is beneficial or costly to a given private party,
The question is a subjective one: the fact that property imposes a private
burden on A does not mean that it would impose a private burden on B. This
subjective stance explains Table 1’s equation of private benefits and
burdens with wanting or not wanting the property, respectively. 117 While
property with a negative expected value would be unwanted by almost
everyone (at least in the absence of a compensating transfer payment),
115
There are of course many additional tools, such as taxes and subsidies, that the government can use to
influence the attractiveness of ownership.
116
By minimally plausible, I do not mean to suggest that the indicated form of government coercion will
always or very often be appropriate, much less that it will always or very often be observed. Rather, these are sets
of necessary conditions, which may or may not be sufficient in a given instance to justify the use of government
power. It is also obviously possible for the government to engage in the acts named in the chart when the
conditions are not met – as where eminent domain inefficiently moves property to a lower-valuing user. The
point of the chart is not to assert that government always or only engages in these acts when the stated conditions
are met, but rather to suggest that these conditions would form a minimum predicate for an appropriate exercise of
the power.
117
I set aside the possibility that people want property that will harm their own subjectively perceived
interests or want to be rid of property that will further their own subjectively perceived interests.

28

Fennell

[6-Nov-13

property need not have a negative expected value to be unwanted by
particular parties; there may be autonomy or personhood issues at stake, or
simple risk aversion.
The distinction between Table 1’s left and right columns goes to
whether ownership by the specified party is socially beneficial or socially
costly. Because the table focuses on conditions that might cause the
government to change the assignment of ownership, the left column
involves socially beneficial ownership by someone who is currently not an
owner, while the right column involves socially costly ownership by
someone who is the current owner. Much turns on the word “ownership.” If
we assume that the government has free rein to make and collect transfer
payments to address distributive or other justice concerns, the only reason
to employ coercion to change a property’s ownership would be if ownership
itself in a given pair of hands conferred social benefits or imposed social
costs above and beyond what could be conveyed or collected through an
expected-value equivalent transfer payment.118
The most familiar manifestation of government coercion is found in
Cell II: takings and other coercive dispossessions.119 Takings become
plausible when ownership (by the current owner) has become publicly
costly120 yet remains privately beneficial to, and hence wanted by, that
owner. If the first condition were not met, the ownership change produced
by the taking would lack normative justification, and if the second condition
were not met, the transfer would not be coercive.
Consider next Cell I, in which ownership by a given nonowner is both
socially beneficial and privately beneficial for that party. The government
may confer ownership on the party—a giving.121 Thus, property condemned
through eminent domain may be reconveyed to a private party. Notably,
givings are not coercive insofar as the ownership interests they confer are
either actively pursued—as is typically the case in the eminent domain
context—or passively welcomed. The collection of an associated payment
118
The ability of the government to make and collect transfer payments also carries implications for the
stability of the rows, as discussed below. See infra Part III.D.
119
“Takings” is a doctrinal term of art that builds in a payment obligation. Because some government
actions that dispossess owners coercively do not require compensation (consider, for example, civil forfeitures),
the cell’s description must be broadened beyond those actions that would count as takings. The term “givings”
has not been imbued with a parallel collection requirement and so can encompass both collectable and noncollectable transfers. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 590-604 (distinguishing chargeable from
nonchargeable givings); see also id. at 549, n.2 (suggesting some ambiguity on this point, and the possibility that
nonchargeable givings might not need to be referred to as givings). I will use the terms “forcings” and
“relievings” in a similarly inclusive manner. The question of transfer payments to accompany these moves will be
examined below. See infra Part III.C. For ease of exposition, I will use the unadorned term “takings” to refer to
all coercive dispossessions, except where it becomes necessary to draw a distinction between compensated and
uncompensated dispossessions.
120
Ownership might be publicly costly because of direct effects (nuisance, blight) or because of opportunity
costs (because it blocks ownership by a higher valuing user).
121
My use of the term “giving” here corresponds to Bell and Parchomovsky’s category of “physical
givings.” See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 564, 567-69.
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for a giving may be coercive, however—a point to which I will return
below.122
The bottom row of Table 1 contains exercises of governmental power
with respect to property interests that impose net private burdens. Cell III
represents the convergence of privately burdensome but publicly beneficial
ownership—circumstances in which forcings might become plausible.123
Recognizing forcings suggests a fourth category, here dubbed
“relievings.” Relievings lift the obligations of ownership upon approval of
the erstwhile owner and place them upon a new owner (who might be the
government). This approach becomes plausible when ownership by a
current owner is both socially costly and privately burdensome. The
relationship between forcings and relievings bears examination. Forcings
make relievings less costly by opening up the possibility of compelled
transfers to private parties. Conversely, the failure to offer a relieving
mechanism will, at least under certain conditions, produce a form of forced
ownership by compelling retention.
B. Ownership Alignments and Misalignments
Table I offers insight into mismatches that might occur between private
and social payoffs and between these payoffs and the current ownership
assignment. In Cells II and III, current ownership aligns with private
payoffs but misaligns with societal payoffs. By contrast, Cells I and IV
present situations in which current ownership is misaligned with both social
and private payoffs. Mismatches between private and social costs present
conditions for potential coercion against the party in question (Cells II and
III), while correspondence between private and social costs (Cells I and IV)
presents conditions in which the party in question might be the beneficiary
of coercive action that the government takes against others.
Of course, ownership is often aligned with both social and private
payoffs. Table II shows how the domains of government action introduced
in Table I fit together with ordinary ownership and nonownership, as well
as with some additional types of misalignment.

122
My focus here is on possessory ownership interests. The broader literature on givings focuses primarily
on “windfall recapture” associated with the conferral of nonpossessory benefits on landowners. When coercively
applied, this model edges close to a forcing, but remains distinguishable for reasons discussed below. See infra
Part IV.A.1.
123
The focus here is on cases where a current nonowner would be compelled to become an owner, but as we
will soon see, there is a shadow form of forcings that involves forced retention by a current owner. It should be
noted, however, that forced retentions are heterogeneous than the forced acquisitions under consideration here,
insofar as private and public acts and omissions can combine in innumerable ways to make it practically difficult
or legally impossible to terminate ownership.
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Table 2: Aligned and Misaligned Ownership

Table 2 expands the lefthand column shown in Table 1 to include socially
beneficial ownership by the current owner as well as by a current
nonowner, and expands the righthand column to include socially costly
ownership by a nonowner as well as by a current owner.
When these states of the world are added, two new misalignment
possibilities emerge. The first is found in Cell II, where ownership is
desired by a nonowner but is socially costly. Blocked acquisition would
respond to this particular misalignment of private and social payoffs. For
example, eligibility criteria might be applied to would-be landowners to
establish that they have the wherewithal to care for the property and to
ensure that they will not be able to shirk in ways that will offload costs on
society.
An additional misalignment emerges in Cell III, where a current owner
finds ownership privately costly, though it remains socially beneficial.
Here, a potential governmental response is forced retention. Alienability
restrictions and bans on abandonment of real property offer real-world
examples. There is, however, an empirical question about whether the
compelled prolongation of ownership actually produces social benefits that
would justify the Cell III placement, or whether forced retention instead
produces the sorts of social costs that might locate the situation in Cell IV,
the proper domain of relievings.124
Table 2’s expanded set of alternatives also includes two ubiquitous
124

I discuss below one reason that the Cell III characterization might remain accurate even if forced
retention itself inflicts costs on society. See text accompanying note 144, infra.
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cases of complete alignment between private and social payoffs and
ownership assignment. The first, found in Cell I, is ordinary ownership;
here, the current owner finds ownership beneficial, and so does society.
Cell IV contains the opposite (but equally congenial) situation in which a
nonowner views ownership as aversive and so too does society. Together,
these cells might suggest that private and social payoffs to ownership are
not independent of each other. Thus, we might say that in the ordinary case
of ownership, the social benefits largely flow from the very fact that the
ownership is deemed privately beneficial. Similarly, in the ordinary case of
nonownership, social costs stem from the unwanted status of the property.
These observations might lead us to question whether there is any
meaningful content in Cells II and III. Underpinning the presumed
correlation between private and social returns to ownership, however, is an
implicit assumption that the market system works with reasonable
efficiency in assigning ownership to high valuers. The fact that a person
values ownership enough to win it under such a system makes out a pretty
good (although not airtight) case that her ownership will also be socially
beneficial. Similarly, the fact that one does not value ownership enough to
win it under these same market conditions suggests that one’s ownership is
likely to impose social costs—at the very least, the opportunity cost
associated with keeping the property out of the hands of a higher valuer.
Why then would misalignments occur between the private and social
costs or benefits of ownership? To ask the question is to suggest its answer:
externalities. Some property entitlements may attract high bidders who are
only willing and able to attain that status because ownership offers
opportunities to offload costs on others. Conversely, ownership may fail to
attract the most socially valuable voluntary owners if too many of the social
benefits produced by ownership take the form of positive externalities the
owner cannot capture. Holdout problems that impede the movement of
property to a higher valuer represent a special case of externalities. Here,
overstated private valuations aimed at garnering more surplus from a
transfer can actually keep the property from reaching a higher valuer—a
social loss that exceeds the harms suffered by the overstater alone.
C. Realignments With and Without Compensation
It is well understood that takings (as well as uncompensated
confiscations and regulations) can address externalities. But how could
forced ownership do so? There are two possibilities, though we will soon
encounter difficulties, familiar from takings jurisprudence, in telling them
apart. The first involves using coerced ownership to internalize normatively
relevant impacts. Thus, property boundaries might be drawn or redrawn to
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require owners to accept a full package of outcomes or nothing at all.
Likewise, certain acts undertaken on or with property may be bundled with
their consequences (the break and buy rule).
Alternatively, forced ownership might amount to a mandate that a party
undertake or continue an ownership relationship that will produce positive
spillovers for (or absorb negative spillovers from) the community. Because
this alternative is most likely to be valuable to society where the
individual’s past choices (including existing property holdings) make her
especially well-suited to be the owner of the aversive element, it too may
appear to present nothing more than a bundling requirement. Accordingly,
it cannot be distinguished from the first case solely on the basis of whether
the ownership in question is imposed out of the blue or linked to some
earlier action or acquisition.
Rather, the two cases are distinguishable only on normative grounds. Is
the law merely squaring things up so that the owner shoulders burdens
commensurate with her own operations in the world, or is has it slipped into
the owner’s domain an extra burden that the owner should not by rights
have to bear? In the first case, the forced ownership removes a distortion so
that ownership’s built-in incentive structure can operate unimpeded. In the
second case, ownership is imposed to glean some set of societal benefits
that the owner has no duty to provide. This need not mean that the forcing is
normatively off-limits. Perhaps the benefits it would provide cannot be
acquired at all, or cannot be acquired as cost-effectively, through mere
monetary obligations. If the forcing is cost-justified but the burden it
imposes is not distributively justified, compensation might be used in
conjunction with coercion.125
The normative bifurcation just described mirrors one familiar from the
takings arena. In that context, instead of coercively imposing or
augmenting ownership, the government is coercively taking away
ownership, or whittling it down.126 Some incursions into property rights are
deemed normatively appropriate without compensation because they
address impacts that the owner never had any right to impose. The so-called
nuisance exception to the takings clause is the clearest example, but there
are other “background principles” that are understood to condition title.127
125
This assumes that other normative hurdles are cleared, and that it is possible to compensate for the losses
in question—which may not always be the case where incursions into autonomy are concerned. See infra Part
IV.B.
126
Thus, where forcings can be recast as mandatory bundling, takings can be recast as mandatory
unbundling. When property is taken through eminent domain, ownership tomorrow is unbundled from ownership
yesterday; the unified fee simple package is coercively split. Lesser incursions into property rights may remove
certain prerogatives of ownership or physically commandeer certain pieces of a given parcel.
127
In the case of regulatory incursions, compensation may be unnecessary because the burden is sufficiently
slight or sufficiently reciprocal to count as a taking—in the words of Justice Holmes, it does not go “too far.”
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahan. Regulatory takings analysis is primarily governed by the Penn Central standard. I
will consider below what a Penn Central analogue would look like in the forcings context.
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In other cases, however, the individual has a clear normative right to the
property interest in question, but her ownership is imposing social costs that
make it efficient for the state to end it through a taking. If the constitutional
requirement of public use is met, the taking can proceed, but just
compensation is required.
Just as governmentally coerced ownership changes can come with or
without compensation, so too can unaltered ownership states be
accompanied by payments flowing to or from the government. More
broadly, payments to and from the government can either substitute for or
accompany governmental actions directed at changing or retaining existing
ownership assignments. All of the alternatives shown in Table 2 can thus
be broken down into compensated and uncompensated versions, as Table 3
illustrates.
Table 3: Compensated and Uncompensated Alternatives

As Cell III reflects, both forced acquisition and forced retention can be
compensated or not. In Cell II, we find takings. Because “takings” is a
constitutional term of art that implies mandatory compensation, takings are
always compensated. However, uncompensated incursions are certainly
possible, such as shutting down nuisances, regulating property uses, or
tearing down a house to stop a fire from spreading.128 As the bottom half of
Cell II indicates, blocked acquisitions might also come with compensation
if the blockage is socially valuable but the burden it imposes is not

128
See, e.g., DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 110-20 (2002) (describing
categories of governmental actions that are exempted from takings clause scrutiny)..
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normatively justified.129 Likewise a Cell I possessory “giving” (as following
eminent domain) might or might not be “chargeable” to the recipient.130
And a Cell IV relieving might or might not require payment on the part of
the owner who is relieved of ownership.
Consider next the Cell I and IV situations of ordinary ownership and
ordinary nonownership. These are instances where private and social costs
align with the existing ownership arrangement, and no change in ownership
is indicated. These states of the world can nonetheless be accompanied with
payments to address distributive imbalances or internalize externalities. In
the bottom half of Cell IV, we find ordinary nonownership that can be
accompanied (or not) by taxes, fees, damages, and so on. Thus, a remedy
for damaging or encroaching on property might be in order for distributive
or corrective reasons, but it would not necessarily have to take the form of
coercively altering the ownership assignment. Similarly, rather than forcing
someone to buy additional buffer land around a polluting factory, damages
might instead be assessed while allowing nonownership (of that buffer land)
to continue. Likewise, Cell I’s ordinary ownership might be accompanied
by various forms of “windfall recapture” designed to keep the owner from
unfairly enjoying spillovers from other properties. Thus, it may not be
necessary to actually consolidate possessory ownership in those other
owners or in the windfall recipient in order to align incentives.
The important point to glean from the entries in Table 3 is that questions
about the appropriateness of distributive benefits or burdens can be
disaggregated from questions about the social benefits or costs uniquely
associated with ownership. Payments or collections can occur in
conjunction with or instead of coercive changes in ownership. Thus, forced
ownership should never be used merely to impose a deserved burden if the
expected value equivalent fee or tax would serve as well. By the same
token, forced ownership should not necessarily be taken off the table simply
because it would impose an undeserved burden on its own, given the ability
to accompany it with compensation.131
Because the distributive picture can be separately adjusted through
transfer payments, the important question is whether starting, ending, or
maintaining ownership itself in a particular set of hands produces unique
benefits or inflicts unique costs. Yet even if we answer this question in the
affirmative, alternatives to outright coercion may still dominate, as the next
section explains.
129
Real world examples of blocked acquisitions tend to be based on normative premises that would make
compensation seem inappropriate. For example, a felon may be kept from purchasing a gun without triggering
any compensation requirement. We might wonder, however, whether there might be instances in which disabling
people from owning property should come with compensation.
130
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 590-604.
131
To be sure, there are many questions about the type and amount of compensation that would be adequate
in particular circumstances. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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D. Repricing Ownership
The tables to this point have treated the private party’s desire for or
aversion to ownership as a stable fact. But there are many things that the
law can do to influence the attractiveness of ownership relative to
nonownership—including (but not limited to) taxing it or subsidizing it. If
ownership produces social benefits, it might be encouraged rather than
forced, and if it produces social harms, it might be discouraged rather than
terminated. Such moves could change unwanted property to wanted (and
vice versa) generating shifts between the rows in the tables above and
addressing misalignments between private and social payoffs through
liability rule solutions.
Moreover, if society properly sets the prices, the fact that a payment (or
forgone collection) accompanies a given ownership choice could change the
societal assessment of whether that ownership choice generates social
benefits or costs.132 Thus, a repricing of ownership could not only produce
societally preferred ownership and nonownership patterns, it could
potentially lead to a new understanding of which column a given situation is
understood to reside within.
It is useful to distinguish the discussion here from the one in the
previous section. The previous discussion established that monetary
payments to or from the government can often be used to address
externalities directly, without tinkering with ownership. This would be the
preferred path if ownership itself did not uniquely confer benefits (or
impose costs). The discussion here assumes that ownership does uniquely
confer benefits (or impose costs), but examines ways to bring about
changes in ownership without directly imposing those changes by fiat.
Thus, there are two distinct ways that coercive reassignments of ownership
might be dodged: by using a technology other than ownership to address
external impacts, and by using a repricing mechanism rather than outright
coercion to induce desired ownership patterns.
Wholesale repricing of ownership can be accomplished either through a
system of taxes or subsidies, or by altering other aspects of the ownership
package.133 The sections below consider each in turn.
1. Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies

132
I refer here to the well-known information forcing properties of liability rules. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725
(1996).
133
As discussed in Part IV.A.2 below, more targeted or individualized repricing might also be pursued
through auction mechanisms or price schedules that are refined to account for complementarities.
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Suppose a nonowner would find ownership privately beneficial, but that
ownership relationship will impose social costs. Blocked acquisition would
be an alternative, as Cell II indicates. But the discussion above suggests
another possibility: Pigouvian taxes might be imposed to change an
ownership relationship that is desired because of the cost-offloading
opportunities it provides into an appropriately priced, and hence unwanted,
ownership relationship. If the tax is set right, and if the net social costs are
indeed positive,134 no acquisition occurs and we shift into Cell IV’s realm of
ordinary nonownership.
A converse possibility is presented by Cell III, where a nonowner would
find ownership aversive, but that ownership relationship would produce
social benefits. Just as Pigouvian taxes offer an alternative way to address
the Cell II misalignment flagged above, Pigouvian subsidies might be used
to transform property that is unwanted by a nonowner into property that is
wanted by its (new) owner—a Cell I case of ordinary ownership. In the
case of real property, this might mean setting a very low or even negative
price. For example, Gary, Indiana has recently begun selling vacant homes
for just $1 to qualifying buyers,135 and Detroit’s mayor has introduced
initiatives to provide forgiveable loans and renovation funds to owners
willing to buy vacant houses.136
Similar possibilities exist for the other coercive alternatives shown in
tables above. Distributive considerations will vary among contexts, but the
fact that society can choose between taxes and subsidies (or combinations
thereof) 137 offers a great deal of flexibility.138 There are some difficulties:
judgment proof parties may be unable to meet tax obligations,139 and
governmental bodies suffering from fiscal illusion may be unwilling to pay
for benefits. But many problems of misaligned ownership can be addressed
in this way.

134
The social costs in Tables 1 and 2 are net of any benefits that would be enjoyed by the owner (or anyone
else). Thus, it is not necessary to balance the private benefits against the social costs. Often, liability rules are
used where the private benefits are unknown, as a way to elicit them and gauge whether they exceed the social
costs. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 132, at 725.
135
Steven Yaccino, A Chance to Own a Home for $1 in a City on the Ropes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2013.
136
Kamelia Angelova, Detroit Will PAY You to Take One of These 100 Abandoned Homes, BUSINESS
INSIDER, Feb. 16, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/abandoned-houses-detroit-2011-2?op=1
137
In some cases the distributive picture is more complicated. Consider a case in which the amount that is
required to convince a party to voluntarily part with the property is greater than what seems justified on
distributive grounds. The party could be given a tax and subsidy combination that together captures the
differential in societal value between giving up and keeping ownership. Thus, for example, fair market value
might be offered to a landowner who cedes ownership but some additional increment necessary to make up the
owner’s reservation price might be taxed for keeping ownership. The resulting spread between keeping the
property and giving up the property would meet or exceed the party’s full reservation price, but it would not all
have to be paid out in compensation.
138
For example, if paying to induce the preferred ownership choice would not be appropriate as a matter of
distribution, a tax might instead be applied to the less preferred ownership opportunity.
139
This is a particular issue in the case of abandonment, but one that might be met through a bonding
mechanism. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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2. Adjusting the Ownership Bargain
There are many things that society can do to alter the relative
attractiveness of ownership and nonownership beyond attaching taxes or
subsidies to these choices. Most notably, the bundling together of different
ownership elements can alter the attractiveness of each. Where new or
continuing ownership obligations attach to other or earlier ownership
choices, one can reject the package by never becoming an owner in the first
place.140 Where ownership obligations attach to non-ownership conduct
(such as tortious behavior), rejection of the package may take the form of
changes in primary behavior. Thus, for example, people may interact less
with the chattels of others if they run the risk of being forced to purchase
anything that they damage.141
In some cases, these avoidance behaviors may be socially valuable.
Indeed, they may be the entire point of the bundling exercise in question.
For example, Ian Ayres has suggested that put options could provide
valuable deterrence where they are granted to victims upon the invasion of
their property interests—though he recognizes a risk of overdeterrence if the
strike price is not set appropriately.142 Similarly, making property interests
harder to alienate makes them less attractive to those who would acquire
them only to gain bargaining leverage over another party.143
In other cases, however, added ownership burdens may produce
distortions by effectively taxing the earlier ownership or activity decision—
and in a manner that does not serve to align private and social costs. This
possibility exists, for example, where ownership obligations generate
nonreciprocal social gains or impose uncompensated burdens. Recognizing
the ways in which bundling can either pull apart or realign the social and
private payoffs of ownership leads to interesting lines of inquiry. If widely
dispersed private property ownership generally confers benefits on society,
140
Obviously, would-be owners are unlikely to swear off ownership altogether in response to a given
aversive bundle; rather, they will attempt to find bundles that have acceptable expected values and risks. See
Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 400-02 (suggesting that limits on abandonment may lead to less risk-taking in initial
acquisition decisions).
141
See Epstein, supra note 17, at 850. In these cases, it might not seem any “ownership bargain” is being
adjusted at all, since the triggering condition is tortious behavior and ownership first appears as a penalty.
However, remedies like trover can actually be characterized as bundling ownership interests through something
like a doctrine of relation back. Having broken the thing, it is as if one acquired it before the breakage happened.
One is made retroactively responsible in a way that is indistinguishable from having been the thing’s owner at the
moment one first laid hands on it. It is this earlier proto-ownership relationship that is repriced as a result of the
remedial regime.
142
See AYRES, supra note 5, at 34-36. Of course, complicated protocols for setting the strike price would
undo the information cost advantages mentioned earlier.
143
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009) (discussing
instances in which downstream inalienability—a way of pressuring continued ownership—is used to discourage
initial acquisitions); Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and
Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV 45 (1999) (examining inalienability as a means to control the strategic wielding of
legal rights).
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aversive elements in the property package deserve examination to see what
they are buying society and what they might be costing society (either in
unwanted behavioral changes, or in other aspects of the ownership package
that counterbalance their effects).
Consider forced retention. It has been suggested prohibitions on
abandonment may generate more socially valuable decisions about entering
into and carrying on ownership.144 The ownership package as a whole might
produce social value, then, even if a snapshot during the end stages might
suggest otherwise. In other words, the ownership relationship might be
described as socially beneficial (and hence properly located in Cell III)
because the cost of allowing the owner to end it unilaterally would include
forgoing certain ex ante owner-selection benefits that exceed the costs that
the unwanted ownership relationship inflicts on society ex post. On the
other hand, the inability to end an ownership relationship on one’s own
initiative may produce harmful selection effects ex ante—selecting not for
the willingness to accept costs associated with unwanted retention, but
rather for the ability to offload the bulk of those costs on society.
Importantly, there are multiple dimensions along which the
attractiveness of ownership can be adjusted. Aversive elements of
ownership that do not add social value should receive particular scrutiny.
One such element comprises risk factors that an owner has no ability to
control.145 Where the relevant risks are amenable to the owner’s control, in
whole or in part, responsibility for outcomes can help to align incentives—a
social benefit. But responsibility for risks that are not under the owner’s
control cannot do this. Unless the exposure in question is doing something
else, such as adding diversification or hedging against specific other risks
that the owner faces,146 it represents a gamble that the owner may not desire
and may be in a poor position to bear. Improving the capacity to slice off
and neutralize uncontrollable risks is one way to make the overall
ownership bargain more attractive to potential owners at relatively low
social cost.
Other aspects of the ownership bundle influence the attractiveness of
private property ownership as well. Traditionally, owners have been
delegated a large measure of freedom in determining how to use their
properties.147 But as urbanization has led to increasingly strict land use
144
See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 401 (“a regime that prevents individuals from abandoning real property
might encourage them to use the property in a more sustainable way”); Peñalver, supra note 6, at 214 (“The
common law's distrust of abandonment seems less alien and arbitrary if we approach it from the perspective of a
community in which things are acquired, not in anticipation of quickly throwing them away, but to be kept and
(re)used, or perhaps resold or given away.”).
145
These risks produce a large proportion of the variance associated with homeownership. See, e.g., Lee
Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008).
146
For example, home equity risk might be used to hedge the risk associated with a future home purchase in
the same market or a correlated market.
147
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, supra note 65, at 1719, 1728, 1754–55 (discussing the ways in which property
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controls, and as zoning has classified uses at finer grains, the ability for
owners to freely choose their own agendas for the property has become
increasingly constrained.148
However important and inevitable this
development may be, it does alter the value of property to owners.
Ownership also grants a spatial monopoly—an attribute that might seem
to grow more valuable as urban densities increase. Owners of fortuitously
positioned properties might (or might not) be able to leverage that
monopoly position into substantial shares of surplus from land use
assemblies and other thin-market transactions.149 The chance of exploiting
such a privileged position may be attractive to risk-seeking or optimistic
owners. If eminent domain stands ready to step in, or if other doctrines
such as “abuse of property right” limit the degree to which owners can hold
out,150 the potential monopoly power of the owner diminishes accordingly.
Whatever one may think about this normatively,151 it presents the
interesting positive question of whether curtailing such sources of upside
variance reduce the attractiveness of ownership, at least where downside
risks remain the problem of the owner.152
To be sure, ownership’s attractions, at least for individual households,
often run deeper than the allocation of risks and benefits. Ownership may
simply push the right psychological buttons by purporting to grant owners
an exclusive domain—even if it cannot really deliver on it. There are
cultural factors at work as well, along with advantages that may be largely
contingent on particular legal and social features. For example, homeowners
in the U.S. tend to enjoy much greater security of tenure than renters. Thus,
the relationship between private and social benefits is mutable. Different
motivations may also resonate with different sorts of owner—a point that
may matter to the extent that small-scale widespread ownership is thought
to carry advantages that are different than those that can be achieved
through large ownership blocks.
The point is a general one: recalibrating the ownership package offers
one way to address or arrest misalignments between private and social
payoffs to ownership. And it may at times be the least costly way to
achieve that result.

delegates decisions to owners).
148
See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 289-93 (2008)
(developing the idea of owners as agenda setters).
149
The well-known potential of holdouts to prevent successful land assemblies or raise their costs makes it
highly speculative to what extent any owner might expect to reap an unusually large surplus.
150
See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122
YALE L.J. 1444 (2013).
151
The degree to which ownership can, should, must, or must not embed the power to hold out for more than
one’s true reservation price in an effort to glean surplus from another party is a subject of much debate.
152
Downside risks may be truncated by lenders’ inability (legal or practical) to hold borrowers responsible
for mortgage balances that exceed home values. See, e.g., Zywicki and Adamson, supra note 26, at 30.
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IV. THE USE AND MISUSE OF FORCINGS
A better understanding of the category of forcings can both open up new
policy alternatives and challenge existing ones. The analysis above
pointedly raised questions about why forced ownership would ever
dominate the strategy of repricing ownership, or the simple collection of
money from parties who have imposed negative externalities or enjoyed
positive ones. Section A considers the scope and limits of these and other
alternatives short of compelling full-strength possessory ownership.
Sections B and C explore how a doctrine of forcings might be formulated
and cabined, focusing on compensated and uncompensated forcings,
respectively. Section D briefly explores the domain of relievings.
A. Alternatives to Forced Ownership
Compulsory ownership occupies a potentially interesting niche in
property law, but may be used in ways that are neither necessary nor
appropriate. Pulling apart the rationales for forcing ownership reveals that
very often an alternative short of full-fledged possessory ownership will be
more suitable.153 In some cases, what is really desired is not ownership
itself, but rather a collection mechanism for imposing normatively justified
burdens. Even when ownership produces unique benefits, it might be
encouraged through pricing mechanisms, including auctions. Finally, stakes
in a particular property or enterprise could be mandated without requiring
possession, or downside risk alone could be assigned through a bonding
mechanism.
1. Collections Distinguished
As the discussion above indicated, the fact that it is normatively
appropriate to impose a burden on a particular party does not establish, on
its own, that the burden should take the form of an unwanted ownership
interest. Thus, externalities may often be addressed through systems of
payments and collections. Mundane examples include the imposition of
taxes, fees, and damages of various sorts when a party’s actions cause
impacts that her own property ownership interests do not automatically
charge against her account. A look at the less familiar realm of
governmental givings helps to further illuminate the distinction between
collecting funds and imposing ownership.
Governmental actions can bestow benefits as well as impose
153
Although these alternatives may be less intrusive, they would not necessarily eliminate the need to
evaluate burdens under the takings clause.
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burdens.154 Sometimes these benefits are actively sought by their recipients;
at other times, the government simply enacts a policy or plan that benefits a
particular area or a particular group, while burdening others. The givings
literature has focused on the challenge of recapturing the windfalls that arise
through government action.155 Central questions involve when and how
charges can be imposed for benefits conferred.156
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have focused on a number of
features that they find relevant to the question of charging for benefits.157
One of these features is what they term “refusability.”158 They note that a
benefit that is forced on a recipient and then coupled with a charge amounts
to a put option—i.e., a forcing. Because they find forcings objectionable
and inconsistent with autonomy, they suggest instead that charges only
apply after the individual has accepted the benefit, or after she has realized a
gain associated with it (as upon sale of a benefited property).159 Their first
alternative, actual acceptance, fits well with the term “giving” insofar as it
requires the recipient’s consent (though perhaps it is better understood as
“selling” given that payment is demanded in exchange).
Bell and Parchomovsky’s second alternative, the coerced collection of a
realized gain, sounds more like a forced purchase. Yet in an important
sense, it is not. As suggested above, the ownership strategy is crucially
about responsibility for outcomes rather than expected values, and hence
involves bearing risk. If the governmentally-installed improvement down
the street from a given home is expected to generate $100K in added value
for that home, then truly forcing a sale of those benefits would mean
collecting now and letting the homeowner bear the risk that the actual value
added will be higher or lower. Under Bell and Parchomovsky’s approach,
this risk is not borne by the homeowner. Instead, she only disgorges the
benefits that she actually realizes upon sale. This has a financial impact on
her, to be sure, but it does not require her to bear the risk of outcomeownership.
2. Repricing (and Its Limits)
Ownership in a private party’s hands may dominate a system of transfer
payments if that party is better positioned to bear or influence the variance
154
Indeed, unless governmental actions are imposed for no reason, they are necessarily accompanied by
benefits that go to other parties. Takings thus imply givings. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 549
(“Like a reflection in a mirror, the massive universe of takings is everywhere accompanied by givings.”)
155
See generally id.; Hagman & Misczynski, supra note 9.
156
See, e.g., Rachelle Alterman, Land Use Regulations and Property Values: The “Windfalls Recapture”
Idea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON URBAN ECONOMICS AND PLANNING (Nancy Brooks, Kieran Donaghy and
Gerrit-Jan Knapp, eds., 2012).
157
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 9, at 590-605.
158
Id. at 601-04.
159
Id. at 603-04.
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associated with potential outcomes. This does not establish that ownership
should be forced, however—it might instead be repriced.160
Heterogeneity in the benefits or costs produced by ownership in
different places or in the hands of different owners can make pricing
challenging, as can nonlinearities in the cumulative effects of ownership
patterns. The latter phenomenon can be illustrated well by studies showing
that clusters of foreclosures within close proximity of each other have
disproportionately large effects on nearby property values.161 Consequently,
the social benefits of addressing foreclosure spillovers through changes in
ownership patterns might grow nonlinearly as the number of such
forcelosures increases. Similarly, inducing ownership here may be more
valuable than inducing ownership there, or a particular spatial pattern of
ownership or nonownership may be especially important to achieve or
avoid.
Of course, it is not necessary that a repricing strategy be pursued acrossthe-board for a particular type of ownership; more tailored possibilities
exist. For example, if it is essential that a particular parcels pass into
private ownership (or into new private ownership) without fail, then some
kind of auction mechanism might be used. The fact that a given parcel
might have negative expected value presents no impediment; auctions can
easily be used to allocate bads as well as goods. This point is readily
illustrated by airline oversales procedures, which typically employ an
informal auction mechanism to get sufficient passengers to accept the bad—
a bump to a later flight.162
Repricing can also be tailored to differentially attract different potential
owners. Thus, a subsidy program might be limited to people who are
especially well-positioned to take on a certain ownership obligation.163 An
example of such selective repricing is found in “blotting” programs that
allow homeowners to cheaply purchase city-owned vacant lots that adjoin
their own residential parcels.164 The program can be understood as an
160

See supra Part III.D.
See, e.g., Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been, and Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated
Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J HOUS. ECON 306, 317 (2008); [add new studies].
162
The approach can be classified as a reverse Dutch auction, with increasingly larger amounts offered until
enough takers are found. See INHABER, supra note 92, at 44-45.
163
In some cases, minimum financial requirements might be applied in an effort to ensure that the new
owners will be able to adequately discharge their obligations. Yaccino, supra note 135 (reporting that Gary,
Indiana’s program allowing home purchases for $1 requires “a minimum income threshold (starting at $35,250 for
one person) and . . . the financial ability to bring the neglected property up to code within six months.”) The Gary
program also contains a feature in common with earlier homesteading enactments: owners must live in the
property for five years before they receive full ownership rights. See id.; supra note 95.
164
The term “blotting,” coined by the Brooklyn planning and design firm Interboro comes from the
contraction of “block lot.” See David Lepeska, Is Blotting the Best Solution for Shrinking Cities? ATLANTIC
CITIES, Nov. 10, 2011; City of Chicago, Adjacent Neighbors Land Acquisition Program (ANLAP),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/adjacent_neighborslandacquisitionprogramanlap.html ;
Kate Davidson, Blotting Update: Detroit Wants to Sell You This Lot for $200, Michigan Public Radio, Changing
Gears, Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.michiganradio.org/post/blotting-update-detroit-wants-sell-you-lot-200 .
161
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attempt to capitalize on complementarities that exist between an owners’
current holdings and adjacent ones. The obligations of ownership over the
vacant lot are likely to be self-enforcing (the owner lives next door and will
personally suffer spillovers from any neglect). As a result, society can glean
greater net benefits from the ownership arrangement.
The situations in which repricing is least likely to offer a complete
solution mirror the situations that justify eminent domain: ones in which
several complementary changes in ownership are necessary, and failure to
achieve the full set torpedoes the chance for nearly all of the available social
gains. In the takings context, offering a payment to a landowner whose
privately beneficial ownership of a chunk of land stands in the way of a
valuable highway assembly will not always be enough; holdout problems
can interfere with the ordinary processes of buying and selling. Similarly, a
nonowner’s veto power might stand in the way of a desired pattern of
ownership under certain circumstances, some of which will be explored
below.165
3. Bonds and Stakes
Ownership’s distinctive social value comes from its capacity to place
actual outcomes on owners. Full possessory ownership does this in a
particular way, by automatically imposing those costs or conferring those
benefits that (literally) come with the territory. It is an especially suitable
strategy where it is easier to define and contain the set of relevant outcomes
by placing physical borders around a resource than it is to enumerate and
separately contract over the relevant outcomes.166 But, as is well
recognized, physical boundaries may operate in both overinclusive and
underinclusive ways in channeling relevant outcomes to the accounts of
owners. For this reason, physical possession alone is not sufficient to fully
align incentives. And, importantly for the present discussion, physical
possession is not always necessary to address incentive problems, either.
One facet of this point was made above in observing that taxes, fees,
and damages can be used to align incentives. However, these monetary
impositions are often based on expected rather than actual outcomes, for
reasons that relate to administrability. Yet sometimes it is possible to isolate
and track actual outcomes as they unfold over time, and to charge those
actual outcomes to a party without making that party a possessory owner.
Bonding mechanisms and other required forms of stakeholding can often
achieve the beneficial effects of compulsory ownership without actually
compelling full possessory ownership.
165
166

See Part IV.B.
This approach corresponds to Smith’s “exclusion strategy.” See text accompanying notes 65-68, supra.
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Consider laws that mandate the advance posting of bonds. The basic
idea can be illustrated by bottle deposits: the up-front payment for the bottle
is designed to cover the social costs of its improper disposal, but that
payment can be recovered if the bottle is returned.167 The risk of an
improper disposal is thereby shifted to the bottle’s owner, who holds a put
option to sell the bottle back in recyclable condition.168 While the bottle
deposit operates in a binary way—if you return the bottle, you get the full
deposit back—it is obviously possible to have bonding mechanisms that
look to some observable indicia of actual outcomes (water quality or air
quality, for example) to determine how much of a given bond will be
returned.169
Nicolaus Tideman has suggested that this approach could be applied to
abandoned land.170 The fact that it can be costly to restore derelict land to a
marketable state can explain common law prohibitions on the abandonment
of fee interests. It is also the reason that a positive payment might need to
accompany at least some abandonments.171 But suppose landowners were
required to pay an amount up front sufficient to cover these costs—
whenever they added structures or other improvements to the land, or
engaged in uses that might impact the land’s future marketability. Then it
would be possible for the state to offer a rebate to those who choose to
voluntarily relinquish their land in good condition (e.g., free of dilapidated
structures, without latent dangers in the yards and driveways, without
environmental hazards requiring remediation).172 Even if the property had
some problems, the associated costs could simply be deducted from the
rebate, just as damages to a rental unit are deducted from the security
deposit.
Bond-posting shifts risk, along with the burden of proof, to the party
posting the bond.173 In the example just given, the bond could enable a
167
The bottle deposit is an intuitive example, but the approach has been generalized. See, e.g., PETER BOHN,
DEPOSIT-REFUND SYSTEMS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONNMENTAL, CONSERVATION, AND
CONSUMER POLICY (1981); Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton, Two Generalizations of A Deposit-Refund System,
NBER Working Paper No. 7505 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7505. Robert M. Solow and
Edwin S. Mills are credited with laying the intellectual foundations for this approach in independent work. See
Robert M. Solow, The Economist’s Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 173 SCIENCE n.s. 498 (Aug. 6, 1971);
EDWIN S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 259-60 (1972).
168
See Robert Costanza & Charles Perrings, A Flexible Assurance Bonding System for Improved
Environmental Management, 2 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 57, 59 (1990) .
169
The bonding idea has even been extended to social policy objectives, with payouts tied to the
achievement of certain social goals or improvement along particular metrics. Ronnie Horesh, Injecting Incentives
Into the Solution of Social Problems: Social Policy Bonds 20(3) ECON. AFFAIRS (2000); [add cites].
170
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial Externalities,
66 LAND ECON. 341, 346 (1990).
171
Such a payment might be made in kind. See Strahilevitz, supra note 6, at 420 (“An owner seeking to
abandon land should be able to do so upon cleaning up or improving the property sufficiently to give it positive
market value.”).
172
These deposits would run with the land, so that expected rebates would get capitalized into negotiated
resale prices as well.
173
See Costanza & Perrings, supra note 168, at 65.

6-Nov-13]

FORCINGS

45

clean exit from a possessory ownership relationship. Bonds could also
stand in for possessory ownership. A party who is thought to occupy an
especially good position to bear some risk or influence some result (but who
does not need to be in physical possession of a particular piece of property
to do so) could be required to post a bond that will be returned in whole or
in part depending on actual outcomes. Thus, instead of requiring a new
factory to buy up the properties of the surrounding homeowners, the factory
owner might merely be required to post a bond that would be sufficient to
cover the “worst case scenario” effects of its noise, effluents, and vibrations.
This bond, or a portion of it, could be returned after a period of years based
on objective measures of these impacts, or of their derived impacts on home
values.
Posting a bond is one way of linking one’s own payoffs to future states
of the world, and thereby bearing risk and accepting responsibility. The
idea can be broadened to all forms of “taking a stake” in a particular
property interest, enterprise, or outcome. While owners of possessory
interests are obviously stakeholders, it is possible to hold a stake without
being in physical possession.174 Where achieving a social goal depends on
the incentive and risk allocations associated with financial stakes, but where
the incentives in question can operate without being in physical possession,
mandatory stakeholding can be an alternative to full-strength forced
ownership.
Although the idea of forced stakeholding sounds unusual, there are
some antecedents. As private contracting behavior demonstrates, sometimes
property holdings can serve a “hostage” role in channeling behavior.175 A
recent example is Apple’s announcement that CEO Tim Cook will be
required to hold ten times his base salary in shares.176 If a person or entity is
thought to be especially well-positioned to determine whether an enterprise
succeeds or fails, a required stake in the enterprise might be expected to
powerfully harness incentives.
The model could, in theory, be extended to governmental impositions of
ownership stakes, as a recent proposal by Gideon Parchomovsky and Endre
Stavang illustrates.177 Because stakeholding can be extended to parties
beyond those in physical possession, it offers a flexible alternative to co174
By the same token, the person who is in physical possession may not be the best person to bear certain
risks associated with the property.
175
See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).
176
Adam Satariano, Apple Requires CEO Cook to Hold 10 Times Salary in Stock, Bloomberg.com, Mar. 1,
2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-01/apple-requires-ceo-cook-to-hold-10-times-salary-instock.html. Other senior executive officers are required to own shares equal to three times their base salary. Id.
177
Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, Environmental Options (working paper, ALEA 2013)
(presenting a proposal in which a firm might be required to purchase futures in a “green” enterprise). Although
the authors call the interest that the business is required to buy an “option,” it is better described as a future
because the business is forced to exercise it “even at a loss.”

46

Fennell

[6-Nov-13

ownership for parties whose holdings mutually spill over onto each other’s.
Indeed, the semicommons arrangement in medieval common fields can be
understood as a blunt-force way of compelling owners of farming strips to
take a stake in the fate of the field as a whole, and not just a segregable
corner of it. The possibility of extending this concept to communities and
neighborhoods has received some scholarly attention.178
Taking a stake in an outcome means effectively placing a bet on it,
which can in turn harness parties’ ability to influence the outcome of that
bet. Allowing multiple parties to take stakes in a single outcome opens up
the possibility of elegant solutions to otherwise intractable incentive
dilemmas.179 When more than one party can influence a given outcome,
assigning the upside or downside risk to only one of them will weaken the
incentives to the others. Various ways of splitting up gains and losses are
possible, but each comes with drawbacks. Mechanisms that allow each
party to bear the full risk associated with her inputs can help to align
incentives.180
Of course, the fact that certain arrangements help to align incentives
does not necessarily make out a case for mandating them. Parties might be
expected to opt into beneficial stakeholding arrangements. But there are at
least two reasons why it might be helpful to keep the idea of mandatory
stakeholding on the slate of possible alternatives.
First, temporarily mandated (or even just subsidized) stakeholding could
help to generate an initial critical mass to support the development of
voluntary stake-taking markets. Consider, for example, the idea of having
local residents buy shares in new developments. This “crowdfunding” idea
has been floated as an antidote to NIMBYism.181 If all homeowners in a
particular residential area were automatically endowed with a small stake in
the neighboring commercial district, we might expect collective action in
support of optimal development to take hold in a way that might not be
possible if households could selectively opt in or out.182
178
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 17475 (2010) (sketching a model in which neighboring jurisdictions would be required to buy a certain number of
securities indexed to each other’s local property values).
179
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002); [Robert Cooter &
Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm, J. LEGAL STUD. (2006)]. The theoretical underpinnings of this
move can be found in Robert Cooter’s idea of “double responsibility at the margin.” Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort,
Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1985); see also Coase, supra note
211, at 41 (proposing a “double tax system” for both sides of a land use conflict).
180
See, e.g., sources cited in note 179, supra. This idea underlies, for example, some proposals to decouple
the award of tort damages to plaintiffs from the amount of damages collected from defendants. Care must be taken
in structuring these arrangements to avoid creating other distortions, however. See Nuno Garoupa & Chris
William Sanchirico, Decoupling as Transactions Tax, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469–72 (2010) (observing that
legal rules structured to incentive both plaintiffs and defendants through decoupling may operate as a tax on the
transaction as a whole by reducing its joint payoff.
181
See Matthew Yglesias, The Real Estate Crowdfunding Scheme That Could Revolutionize Urban Policy by
Defeating NIMBYism, SLATE, June 5, 2013.
182
Similarly, tenants in gentrifying areas might be required to hold securities that are indexed to property
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Second, stakeholding is a less intrusive alternative that might be
considered in contexts where forced ownership is currently used or
contemplated. When considered in conjunction with the other alternatives
to forced ownership discussed above, the possibility of stakeholding further
refines and limits the conditions in which an outright forcing would
dominate. Rather than viewing these mechanisms as falling completely
outside of the domain of forcings, however, it may be more useful to see
them as specialized instantiations of it, where the ownership interest in
question is narrowly defined to comprise a certain set of outcomes.183
B. Compensated Forcings
Compensated forced ownership offers an interesting conceptual analog
to eminent domain, even if its domain is limited in some of the ways
already suggested. This section will consider how a doctrine of
compensated forcings might be developed, noting places where it might
have operative traction.
1. Forcings for Public Use
Consider the possibility that forcings could serve a policy function
analogous to (if more limited than) eminent domain. Just as eminent domain
represents a call option held by the government, a forcing represents a put
option that is held by the government. We might initially wonder why
resort to such an option would ever be necessary, given the potential to
reprice ownership or to identify willing owners through an auction process.
Unlike potential sellers, who may hold a spatial monopoly on a sought-after
parcel, potential buyers (or, potential accepters of property) are rarely in a
similarly unique position.184 They can compete against each other even
when the interest in question carries negative value, as airline passengers do
in the context of oversold flights.185
In some cases, though, parties are locked in bilateral monopolies with
each other that grant monopoly power to potential buyers as well as
values—another stake-realigning move that could reduce resistance to certain kinds of community changes. See
BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 369 (2005) (“Tenants could get a long-run stake in the community if
they were required to buy some variety of security that was pegged to the town’s or neighborhood’s total property
value.”); see also Robert I. Lerman and Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting Neighborhood Improvement while
Protecting Low-Income Families *2–3 (Urban Institute Opportunity and Ownership Project No 8, May 2007),
online at http://www.urban.org/publications/311457.html; Fennell & Roin, supra note 193, at 165-71.
183
Bonding and staking, like the other alternatives to ownership discussed here (and like other governmental
actions regarding property) might impose burdens significant enough to trigger compensation requirements.
184
See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE
L.J. 2091, 2093-94 (1997).
185
See INHABER, supra note 92, at 44-45. The system works because there is no realistic ability for the
passengers to collude to drive up the price, and no particular individual who must be specifically coerced to skip
the flight.
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potential sellers.186 Encroachment and accession cases offer simple
examples where restoring unified ownership in complementary goods
requires either a purchase or a sale between two specified parties. To take
another example, the government might wish to produce a particular spatial
pattern of land ownership that packages together complementarities or that
disperses ownership among existing landholders in specified ways. Just as
voluntary purchases may not always produce the aggregated patterns of
land necessary for certain public projects, so too may subsidies fail to do so.
To see the niche that a forcings approach might fill, it is first helpful to
step back and consider why eminent domain is valuable to society. It is not
just that some uses, such as highways and urban redevelopment, require the
aggregation of land. It is that they also require the consolidation of
ownership.187 But why? Lloyd Cohen provocatively explores this question
in his analysis of holdouts.188 He posits that if there were no transaction
costs, holdouts would not be a problem because they could simply retain
separate ownership. The would-be holdout could continue to own, say, an
area within the footprint of a newly developed department store, which he
could seamlessly operate as part of the store.189
Given the costs of coordination and monitoring, however, the idea
breaks down—owners of store fragments could harm each other and benefit
themselves with impunity.190 The corner holdout might steal merchandise
from, or toss garbage into, the other portion of the store, or he might simply
invest too little in improving the store’s reputation, given that he will reap
only a fraction of the benefits. These are, of course, standard “tragedy of
the commons” arguments against dividing or sharing ownership in certain
ways.191 The key point is that the allocation of ownership itself matters,
given the costs of delivering access to resources.
Perhaps the most likely scenario for a forcing would be in cases of
complementarities between an owner’s current properties and related or
adjacent properties that she does not yet own. In some instances, a forcing
could be presented to the owner as an alternative to eminent domain.
Suppose, for example, that our department store holdout were given a
choice between having his property condemned through eminent domain
and receiving fair market value (FMV) for it, or buying out the developer’s
land holdings instead by paying FMV for those properties.192 A landowner
186

See AYRES, supra note 5, at 19-20.
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1015 (2008) (viewing “number of owners” as a central dimension in property, along with asset size and
configuration).
188
Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991).
189
Id. at 353. The inducement to operate the corner as part of the larger store would come from the fact that
this is its most profitable use.
190
See id. at 354.
191
Not all common ownership schemes end in tragedy, of course. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 113.
192
This model shares some ground with certain techniques for dividing property held in common, such as
187
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who placed a high value on retaining possession of his portion of the
property could elect the purchase option. Presumably, the opportunity cost
of the large consolidated holding would prompt an owner to employ the
property in what society might regard as its highest and best use, but if he
did not, he would at least bear the associated cost.193
Purchases might also be compelled where eminent domain is not in
play. For example, in a case of purely private development, the government
might wish to place more property under one owner’s control than would be
independently selected by the developer, perhaps to generate positive
externalities for the surrounding area. Similarly, a local government might
address the concerns of the surrounding community by allowing residents
or businesses to force purchases of their properties on developers who
would transform an area in ways that would make them wish to leave.
Again, these ideas would be most plausible in instances where there is a
particular owner, who because of her other holdings (or proposed other
holdings), is especially well positioned to also own the properties in
question.194
Contrast with this model the idea of turning ownership of unwanted
parcels into a randomly imposed civic burden, like the military draft or jury
duty.195 To make such an idea minimally workable, it would be necessary
to carefully define the eligible pool and place restrictions on
reconveyance.196 However, a lottery among subsidized (and pre-screened)
volunteers or an auction designed to find the eligible person who will accept
the “Texas Shootout” approach to partnership dissolution. See, e.g., Richard W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo, &
Kathryn E. Spier, Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts, 41
Rand J. Econ. 649 (2010); Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L.
REV. 771, 838-43 (1982). In that model, one party makes a valuation and the other party can choose to either buy
out or be bought out at that price. Another analogy is found in the entitlement literature in which parties receive
pairs of choices, such as receiving damages or shutting down an offending use. See Ronen Avraham, Modular
Liability Rules, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 269 (2004); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and
Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rights, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001).
193
Complementarities could also justify a different sort of forced purchase arrangement in the eminent
domain context. When the government acquires property through eminent domain, the purchase does not appear
as a “forced” one from the government’s perspective--the government is free to purchase or not purchase the
property, and to decide what to purchase. However, sensitivity to complementarities that may be disrupted by
condemnation might argue at times for putting the government to a choice between condemning nothing and
condemning a larger chunk than it might otherwise prefer (and compensating for it). Abraham Bell and Gideon
Parchomovsky hint at this idea in discussing the possibility that eminent domain might at times take too little
property rather than too much See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1064-65 (2008). In one application of this idea, a takee (or set of takees)
from whom the government proposes to take just a small slice might receive a put option that would enable her to
force a sale to the government of the full parcel at its fair market value.
194
Cf. Merrill, supra note 17, at 488-91 (describing accession as a way of identifying a fit owner).
195
On the use of randomization strategies to allocate goods and bads, see JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC
JUDGEMENTS, 53-78 (1989).
196
For example, perhaps only residents within a certain radius of the subject property would be included.
Screens based on income and credit history (or willingness to post a bond) could be applied to ensure that the
person would be in a position to bear the obligations of ownership, and hardship exemptions would be available to
those who lacked sufficient time or liquidity to manage the property. Restrictions on reconveyance would be
necessary to ensure that the goals of the program would not be undone through reconveyance to, say, a judgmentproof individual.
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the property at the lowest negative price would likely be more attractive
alternatives. Unless there is some civic value generated by the random
assignment itself, or the random assignment is simply much cheaper to
operate,197 mechanisms that make the transfer voluntary appear preferable.
Consistent with takings doctrine, not all forced purchases would require
compensation,198 nor would compensation necessarily have to be in cash.199
The next section considers how tests used to assess burdens in the takings
context might be adapted to forcings, and section 3 turns to questions of
compensation.
2. Regulatory (and Judicial) Forcings
Forced ownership tends to be most plausible in settings where the owner
has already voluntarily undertaken ownership (or some other possessory
action) with regard to a connected or complementary interest. This is
because coercion will only dominate other alternatives (such as an auction)
where there is a form of monopoly leverage in play, and the typical source
of that leverage will be a party’s existing holdings or possessory interests.
The question then becomes whether requiring ownership of this additional
interest is a type of burden for which compensation is due, or whether it
should be understood as a normatively appropriate adjunct to the voluntary
ownership interest.
Evaluating the burdens associated with forced ownership raises
questions that are familiar from regulatory takings doctrine, though not
easily resolved. What kinds of background conditions are (or should be)
understood to inherently condition title? How much should it matter if one
had notice of an unwanted restriction before one acted or invested? 200 How
much of a diminution in value must be borne without payment? When is an
owner being required to confer benefits on society, the costs of which
should be spread more broadly? All of the difficulties and unanswered
questions that plague takings law find counterparts in forcings analysis. For
example, the possibility that courts as well as the political branches can
engage in takings raises the question of whether a corresponding doctrine of
197
One reason it could be cheaper to operate relates to adverse selection. People who take on ownership
burdens for pay may be willing to do so for less money because they know they have a greater capacity to dodge
the obligations of ownership. This puts more pressure on the screening mechanisms than in a purely volunteer or
randomized system.
198
The question of which governmental interferences with property require compensation has been the
subject of extensive analysis and numerous doctrinal wrinkles. For a classic and influential treatment, see Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
199
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 195-215 (1986) (discussing “implicit in-kind compensation”); id. at
195 (“The Constitution speaks only of ‘just’ compensation, not of the form it must take.”).
200
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (examining the effect of a change of ownership on a
takings claim).
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judicial forcings should be developed.
Recognizing these commonalities might suggest that forcings can be
comfortably folded into existing takings law. To some extent this is true.
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the takings clause is probably the
right place to locate the analysis of burdens associated with property
ownership—including the burden of additional or prolonged property
ownership. The analysis becomes trickier when the precondition for
unwanted ownership is not another form of ownership, but rather some
other activity, such as tortious conduct. In a broad sense, we might say that
the takings clause is meant as a countermajoritarian check against
burdensome governmental interferences with one’s chosen property
arrangements, whether those arrangements involve ownership or
nonownership.
Importantly, however, the takings clause presupposes legitimate action
that requires for its validation only the payment of just compensation—a
liability rule. The due process clause and other constitutional provisions
stand guard against illegitimate government conduct that cannot be
validated through payment. To the extent that forcings interfere with liberty
interests or violate other constitutional provisions, they could not be
legitimated through the payment of compensation. The idea of compensated
forcings presupposes, however, that there are some forms of forced
ownership that are legitimate if (and only if) they are compensated. The
idea makes intuitive sense: the normative justifications for imposing
ownership cannot always be expected to line up with situations in which the
distributive consequences of forced ownership are justified. But as a
doctrinal matter, there is room for debate about the extent, and even the
existence, of a zone in which forcings are both permissible and
compensable.
In deciding whether a permissible forcing requires compensation, the
correct normative analysis would have much in common with takings
analysis insofar as it involves a search for baselines, an analysis of
deviations from those baselines, and consideration of the extent to which
investment-backed expectations have been undermined. When is ownership
itself the sort of burden, or surprise, or burdensome surprise that makes its
uncompensated imposition normatively problematic? These inquiries
always threaten to turn circular in the takings context, and the same is true
when it comes to forcings.
3. Compensation
If just compensation were required for a forcing, what would it look
like? Here, as with eminent domain, FMV would presumably be the
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constitutional touchstone. When ownership carries positive value, a forced
governmental purchase (the government’s exercise of a put option) would
typically involve the government collecting money, not paying it out. Of
course, it is entirely possible for property to carry a negative FMV.
Depending on the obligations that go with the ownership interest in
question, then, the strike price for the governmental exercise of a put option
might be either positive or negative.201 Typically, though, at least some of
the compensation due would be provided in kind through the ownership
interest itself.
Eminent domain is controversial in significant part because of factors
for which the government’s just compensation measure does not adequately
compensate.202 Mirror-image concerns arise in the case of forcings. First,
there is the question of how and whether subjective valuations should play
into compensation. In place of the positive subjective premium typically
attributed to existing owners, there is a presumptive subjective deficit
associated with forced ownership. Just as we can assume most condemnees
have valuations above FMV (given that they have not already sold), we can
assume that most forced purchasers have valuations below FMV (given that
they have not already bought).
Second, whereas condemnees are deprived of opportunities to realize
gains from trade (or other above-expected-value returns), forced purchasers
are made to bear the chance of losses to the extent ownership assigns them
actual outcomes.203 Thus takings swap an expected value (derived through
FMV) for an actual outcome, while forcings do the opposite. If people are
thought to be risk averse, then there could be an asymmetry between the
two situations. While just compensation (as currently constitutionally
defined) does not give condemnees anything for giving up a chance at a
larger-than-average gain from trade (nor charge them anything for relieving
them of worse-than-expected results), it is an open question whether a
forcing should require some compensation for taking on the risks of
ownership, beyond the expected value that those risks present.
Third, as already noted, there is an autonomy or dignitary interest that is
implicated to the extent that ownership affects one’s self-definition.204 This
consideration is the trickiest to address, here as in the case of eminent
domain, because it is not truly amenable to monetary compensation. In the
201
A negative strike price would mean that the holder of the option (here, the government) could force
ownership on an individual, but would have to pay the individual. Viewed from another angle, we might say that
the government in this scenario holds a call option that enables it to pay a positive price to engage in an activity
that imposes costs: the offloading of ownership. Nothing turns on which term is used. Because puts usually
involve forcing ownership onto another party, I have used that terminology here.
202
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 1077 (suggesting that the measure of compensation
provides at least a partial explanation for why property owners are concerned about the definition of “public use”).
203
It is also true that condemnees may be saved from experiencing actual losses, and that forced purchasers
may experience actual gains. The focus in the text is on the aversive side of the compelled change in ownership.
204
See text accompanying notes 57-61, supra.

6-Nov-13]

FORCINGS

53

forcings context, autonomy concerns might be addressed either by allowing
an escape hatch,205 or by limiting the uses of forcings to contexts where
autonomy concerns are unlikely to be implicated. Here, it would be fruitful
to consider differences with respect to autonomy among types of owners
and types of property. Corporate owners might have fewer autonomy
concerns than individuals, and fungible property interests might present
fewer autonomy concerns than properties of a more personal nature.206
C. Uncompensated Forcings
Existing examples of involuntary ownership, such as trover and
accession, tend to be uncompensated. The implicit assumption behind these
remedies is that they represent normatively appropriate burdens associated
with earlier acts. As already emphasized, burdens can be assessed without
resorting to burdens that take the form of ownership. The interesting
question is whether existing forms of uncompensated forced ownership
represent all of the instances, or only those instances, in which putting a
normatively justified burden into the form of mandatory ownership would
best serve social goals.
1. Owning Consequence Zones
Scholars have already examined how put options might be used in place
of other nuisance remedies.207 However, the analysis has typically focused
on the question of being forced to buy an entitlement to, say, emit effluents
at the price of the expected damage that is caused. The goal of this
literature has been to devise ways to get “the entitlement” to the highest
valuer. The implicit assumption is that this task can be completed once and
for all time by carving out and allocating the specific land use right that is in
dispute. A different model would involve the compulsory purchase of the
affected property itself. For instance, residents who are bothered by a
nearby factory might have the option to force the sale of their fee simple
interests to the factory, not just the sale of the right to emit pollutants.208
Under certain circumstances, forcing the sale of the fee interest might
offer advantages over the more well-studied model of forcing the sale of
205

See infra Part IV.D. (discussing the use of relievings as an escape hatch).
Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). Thanks to Eduardo
Peñalver for comments on this point.
207
See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 5.
208
Permanent damages awarded in nuisance effectively place a servitude on the affected land. See Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). A plaintiff that is entitled to elect permanent damages
could thereby force the party causing the nuisance to purchase the servitude. But see Epstein, supra note 17 at 843
(observing that a defendant cannot be forced to continue polluting, and suggesting that only temporary damages
could be imposed on a defendant who elected to shut down instead).
206
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just the entitlement to emit. In cases where there is sharp disagreement
about the actual impacts that will be realized over time, a transfer of
ownership may offer both parties a more acceptable solution than would
permanent damages based on an expected value.209 Second, putting
ownership into the same hands avoids the kinds of incentive problems going
forward that have been raised in the permanent damages context.210 A
polluter who has already paid permanent damages may not innovate to
reduce harm even when it could be done cost-effectively, but a polluter who
owns the land that will be polluted would retain that incentive.211 The
solution is also better incentive-wise than a series of damage judgments
over time that would reflect realized harm, at least to the extent that the
victims in the story could influence the impacts that they will suffer. A
single owner will pursue whichever alternative offers the highest payoff,
whether taking precautions on the adjacent land, adding scrubbers to the
factory, or doing nothing at all.
A single-owner approach also differs from the “risk ownership” idea
propounded by Ripstein. Rather than metaphorically owning the
consequences of one’s acts within normatively constructed conceptual and
causal bounds, one would actually own “consequence zones”—physical
places where certain kinds of impacts are likely to be realized.
Consequence zone ownership need not be imposed only on the party
that desires the more active or invasive use. It would also be possible to
make the party with a complaint about a neighbor’s use buy up that
neighbor’s property. New Jersey’s conditional variances, in which stopping
the grant of a variance means purchasing the property in question, does
something very much like this.212 Following the Coasean idea of reciprocal
harm,213 we can understand the objecting neighbor as being required to
absorb the negative impact that her demands have on the value of the
nearby property—the opportunity cost of keeping the land in its current use.
If forced purchases sound like extreme overkill in managing spillovers
and a radical departure from current practices, consider the fact that we
209
While it might seem that one party is bound to be wrong, the ability of parties to influence outcomes can
turn the game into a positive sum one. Another approach to uncertainty about impacts is to use a bonding
mechanism, as discussed above. See supra Part IV.A.3.
210
See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce such permanent damages are assessed
and paid, the incentive to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated, thereby continuing air pollution of an area
without abatement.”).
211
As with all other inefficiencies, the shortfall in past-payment innovation is the product of positive
transaction costs. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960). If the residents could
costlessly bargain with the factory to invent a better pollution-stopper, this would occur. But of course if the
residents could costlessly bargain with the factory, there would have been no need for a lawsuit and an award of
permanent damages in the first place. Ownership is not the only way to address this problem, however. A
bonding mechanism that granted refunds based on actual results is another alternative, as discussed below.
212
Ownership is not actually forced on the neighbor under New Jersey’s conditional variance model; rather,
her ability to defeat the variance depends on her willingness to buy the property. See note 20, supra and
accompanying text.
213
See Coase, supra note 211, at 2.
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already do something very similar through zoning. People are not allowed
to acquire and use property interests of any size and shape whatever. While
concerns about later reconfiguration costs represent one rationale, a more
basic one is that too-small holdings produce a profusion of boundary lines,
and hence more spillovers that must be managed at positive cost. Indeed,
Peter Colwell observed that governmentally imposed land use restrictions
could be jettisoned altogether if holdings were required to be large enough
(he gives the example of 640 acres) and edges were subject to certain
requirements (such as “very tall berms”).214
There are countervailing considerations, of course. As Yoram Barzel
has observed, there are disadvantages of consolidating ownership in one
person or entity, including scale mismatches between labor and non-labor
inputs and specialization losses.215 Yet zoning operates prophylactically to
mandate minimum bundles for all (even if they are orders of magnitude
smaller than Colwell’s thought experiment). Because forcings could operate
more selectively where spillovers have actually shown themselves to be
troublesome, they would not necessarily increase average parcel size, and
could indeed diminish the incidence of unwanted ownership of excess land.
2. Addressing Territoriality
A forcings model might also be used to require ownership of bundles
that correspond to observed patterns of behavior, including territorial
behaviors. Consider the concerns that have been raised about “curb
territoriality”: the phenomenon of homeowners claiming exclusive rights in
the street parking spots that their homes front upon. A particularly intense
(albeit episodic) subspecies of the problem is found in the “dibs barriers”
that Chicagoans use to mark claims over spaces that they have dug out of
the snow.216 In both cases, the concern is the same: asserting exclusive
private ownership over public parking spaces impedes the efficient rotation
of cars in and out of spaces over the course of a day or week. One
prescription is to deny private claims over the spaces to ensure that they
remain in the commons.
The analysis here suggests another alternative that builds on rather than
fights owners’ territorial impulses. The adjacent landowners could be
required to purchase rights to the parking spaces that front their homes or
businesses, and then be allowed to market those rights in exchange for

214
Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL ESTATE ECON.
525, 529 n.6 (1997).
215
BARZEL, supra note 69, at 51-52 (2d ed. 1997).
216
This practice has received significant scholarly attention. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Allocation of the
Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S515, S528-33 (2002).
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micropayments from parkers.217 Such exchanges may soon become feasible
at low cost due to the ubiquity of smart phones that could be equipped with
parking apps. We might also expect services to emerge to handle the
transactions on behalf of owners. If it becomes possible for would-be
parkers to quickly learn about available spaces and pay to occupy them, the
landowners would be confronted with the opportunity cost of keeping
spaces out of circulation. While some might choose to bear the expense,
most presumably would not.
The question remains whether such an ownership obligation could or
should be imposed without compensation. One possibility would be to link
the purchase requirement to acts of possessory behavior toward the parking
spaces, such as attempting to reserve them even when empty. This would
be a variation on the “you break, you buy” approach. It would also seem
relatively uncontroversial to apply a mandatory purchase requirement in the
case of new development; it would be no different from requiring that a
business make adequate provision for parking.
3. Rethinking Existing Uncompensated Forcings
So far I have focused on possible extensions of uncompensated forcings.
But it is also possible that some existing uncompensated forcings are not
really justified. As noted, burdens can be imposed in a form other than
ownership if ownership itself does not produce advantages. I have focused
primarily on the ability of ownership to deliver outcomes going forward.
However, sometimes the advantages that ownership produces are not of this
nature; they instead involve economizing on information costs about past
and present events, including decision costs about the allocation of
ownership itself.
Consider again the remedies of accession and trover. Here, the reason
for assigning ownership may simply be to save society the costs of figuring
out damages. Yet it is quite possible that society could readily put a figure
to the costs of calculating damages. An actor who is willing to bear those
calculation costs (as well as the costs of the damages themselves, once
calculated) could be relieved of ownership without imposing any costs on
society as a whole. Similarly, abandonment may be primarily socially
costly because it creates confusion or involves the offloading of land that
has already been damaged in some way. If these costs could be covered, as
217
If individual ownership of parking rights proved too difficult to implement, collective ownership of the
parking rights by a group of adjacent residents is another possible approach. Cf. GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE
LITTLE PLATOONS: SUB-LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MODERN HISTORY 58-59 (1995) (describing an approach used
in St. Louis County in which “title to the bed of a street is deeded to the residents adjacent to it, subject to
assessments enforceable by a lien,” with the streets then managed by an association of the owners). This approach
is similar in spirit to unitization, and similarly might be enabled to proceed on less than unanimous agreement. See
id. (noting that legislation has allowed street privatization in St. Louis upon petition by 95% of the residents).
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through a bonding mechanism, ending ownership would not inflict social
costs. These observations suggest the utility of the converse of forcings,
relievings.
D. Relievings
Most of the discussion in this paper has focused on the situation in
which ownership is socially valuable but privately burdensome. Yet many
situations in which ownership is compelled actually involve social as well
as private costs. Offering a way out of ownership holds social value to the
extent it relieves those who are ill-suited to bear the associated risks or
make the necessary decisions. If ending ownership would be a Pareto
improvement, why does it not happen? To observe that there is currently no
established mechanism through which unwilling owners can be readily
relieved of ownership only begs the question.
The law does at times exhibit a sensitivity to the costs of ownership and
the realities of being forced to continue bearing its burdens. For example, In
re Pratt, a First Circuit case, involved a GMAC-financed Chevy Cavalier
that GMAC refused to repossess after a debtor in bankruptcy surrendered
it.218 No junkyard would accept the now-worthless car without a lien release
from GMAC, but GMAC would not release the lien. The owners, the court
found, “were confronted with the grim prospect of retaining indefinite
possession of a worthless vehicle unless they paid the GMAC loan balance,
together with all the attendant costs of possessing, maintaining, insuring,
and/or garaging the vehicle.” It held that GMAC’s actions, even if permitted
under state law, were “coercive” in effect and thus in contravention of the
discharge injunction under bankruptcy law.219
What the court did in Pratt amounted to a relieving, though it was not
given that name. But relievings are relatively uncommon. Why? Clearly
there are costs associated with providing relief from ownership. Not only
may it be costly to administer a system that delivers such relief, the end
result may be ownership that the government does not want, or the costs
associated with inducing (or forcing) another party to take up ownership.
But suppose some relievings would produce net gains, despite their costs.
The problem may be that it is deemed normatively inappropriate for society
to bear the costs associated with the relieving—both the costs of
administering the system, and the costs that ending ownership will impose,
including heightened information costs, the costs of retransferring the
property, and so on.
This is where the idea of chargeable relievings comes in. Just as there
218
219

462 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006).
Id. at 20.
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may be cases where the social value of ownership does not line up with the
distributive fairness of imposing ownership’s burdens, there may be cases
where the social costs of ending ownership do not line up with the
distributive fairness of relieving the owner of the related burdens.
Compensated forcings on the one hand and chargeable relievings on the
other can accommodate these misalignments. On reflection, the idea of a
chargeable relieving is not odd at all. Relievings amount to put options
against the government; decisions about the charges that will accompany
them simply amount to selecting the strike price.
Put options against the government have been offered in relatively
limited situations, such as the buyback of guns,220 gas guzzling
“clunkers,”221 and fishing boats.222 But they might be offered more
broadly.223 As already suggested, an especially promising application would
be in enabling would-be abandoners to rid themselves of their property in
an orderly manner by paying the costs that their termination of ownership
imposes.224 Similarly, a tortfeasor subject to trover could be allowed to
avoid forced ownership by paying the costs of appraising the damage. Such
an approach would allow a party to transform her position from outcomebearer to damage-payer. Thus, relievings can often constitute a
complementary strategy to—or an escape hatch from—forcings.
CONCLUSION
Government coercion can be used to impose or prolong private
ownership, just as it can be used to cut it short. Yet forcings as a form of
government compulsion has not received a systematic exploration, despite
its evident connection to existing bodies of literature. One might contend
that this neglect is appropriate because the real-world domain of forcings is
likely to be limited or nonexistent for normative or practical reasons. But
that claim cannot be evaluated until we recognize the category itself. Doing
so directs attention to existing forms of forced or pressured ownership, and
prompts exploration of the reasons behind them and the limits on them.
Recognizing a category of forcings focuses new attention on how
ownership, as a mechanism for assigning actual rather than expected
outcomes, can hold social value even when it proves privately burdensome.
220

See Morris, supra note 5, 854-55 (discussing gun buybacks as examples of put options)
See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from the 2009 “Cash for
Clunkers” Program (September 2010) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670759 (studying the impact of the summer 2009
“Cash for Clunkers” program that enabled U.S. motorists to turn in fuel-inefficient cars for destruction in
exchange for a credit against certain new vehicle purchases).
222
See, e.g., L.S. PARSONS, MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES IN CANADA 191 (1993) (discussing fishing
license buyback programs).
223
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 140,at 1457-59 (discussing the use of put options in conjunction with
alienability limits).
224
For a discussion of these costs and some ways to address them, see generally Strahilevitz, supra note 6.
221
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The ability to save on information costs, to allocate risk, and to align
incentives may motivate choices to compel ownership over the objections
of the owner herself. Of course, forced ownership will rarely be the best
answer; there are typically other alternatives that can serve the relevant
social purposes at lower cost. Yet isolating the conditions that could call for
the imposition of ownership shows not only how forcings might be
extended but also where existing forms of involuntary ownership might be
replaced with less coercive alternatives. Finding the niche that forcings
occupy on the slate of policy alternatives also illuminates another
unappreciated domain for governmental action—that of relieving owners of
burdensome ownership.
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